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THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING 
The thirty-eighth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical As-
sociation was held Saturday, March 30, 1968, at Erskine College, Due 
West. About 75 members and guests attended one or more of the programs. 
Following registration and a coffee hour in Watkins Student Center, 
the morning session was held in one of the conference rooms on the second 
floor of that building. Frederick F. Ritsch of Converse College read a paper 
on "Jean-Paul Sartre and Social Responsibility" and Robert D. Bass of 
Erskine College read a paper on "The Last Campaign of Major Patrick 
Ferguson." Albert N. Sanders of Furman University led a discussion of the 
latter paper. 
Luncheon was served in the dining room adjoining Watkins Center. 
At the business meeting which followed, Dr. Bargar thanked President 
Wightman, Dr. Ware, and Erskine College for their hospitality and 
efficient arrangements for the meeting. President Wightman welcomed the 
group and invited members to a reception at the president's home between 
5 and 6 p.m. The minutes of the last meeting were approved as printed in 
the Proceedings for 1967 and the Treasurer's report, which was distributed 
at the meeting, was likewise approved. 
President Bargar then gave his Presidential report, after which Dr. Ochs 
read a tribute to the late Winston Chandler Babb, who was Vice-President 
of the Association at the time of his death. ( Copy attached.) Dr. Ochs 
made a motion that the tribute be printed in the Proceedings and that a copy 
be sent to the family, and the motion was passed. 
Dr. Burnside, for the Executive Committee, presented the following 
slate of officers for 1968-69: 
President: George C. Rogers, University of South Carolina 
Vice-President: Lowry P. Ware, Erskine College 
Secretary-Treasurer: Robert C. Tucker, Furman University 
Executive Committee member ( term to expire 1971): J. M. Lesesne, Jr., 
Wofford College 
Nominations from the floor were called for but there were none and the 
report was accepted. Dr. Burnside informed the members that the Execu-
tive Committee had re-elected Dr. Jack S. Mullins as editor of the Pro-
ceedings. 
Dr. E. N. Lander reported for a special committee consisting of him-
self, Dr. Lewis P. Jones, and Dr. George C. Rogers, which was appointed by 
President Bargar to recommend ways we might observe the state's tri-
centennial. The committee recommended that the Association not have a 
special meeting for the tri-centennial but hold its annual meeting in 
Charleston and have a program consisting entirely of papers on South 
Carolina history. Dr. Lander raised the question whether we should begin 
the meeting on Friday and continue it on Saturday or simply have the 
usual all-day Saturday meeting. 
Mr. Von Hasseln reported that the Executive Committee had accepted 
the invitation of Anderson College to meet there on March 29, 1969. He 
also solicited new members for the Southern Historical Association. 
Dr. Ochs called attention to the brochure Research Opportunities at 
the Federal Records Center of the National Archives at East Point, Georgia, 
available at the registration table. He and Dr. J. Isaac Copeland are 
members of their advisory council. 
The business session adjourned at 2:20 p.m. 
The afternoon session consisted of two papers. Daniel W. Hollis, 
University of South Carolina, read a paper on "Costly Delusion: Inland 
Navigation in the Carolina Piedmont," which was discussed by Carl L. 
Epting, and Hewitt D. Adams, Clemson University, read a paper, "Did 
Jackson Disobey Orders?" which was discussed by Archer Jones, Uni-
versity of South Carolina. 
Following the afternoon session, Dr. J. M. Lesesne, Sr., conducted a 
group of about 25 members on a tour of the Burt House in Abbeville and 
President and Mrs. Wightman had a reception at their home. 
Following the banquet in the Erskine College dining hall, Dr. D. H. 
Gilpatrick, Professor of History, Emeritus, Furman University, read a 
paper, "Clio and the Columnists." Dr. Bargar thanked Dr. Gilpatrick for 
his informative and witty paper and the Erskine members and staff for their 
hospitality and delicious meals and then declared the meeting adjourned. 
WINSTON CHANDLER BABB 
The South Carolina Historical Association notes with sadness the 
sudden and untimely death, on January 21, 1968, of the vice-president 
of the Association, Winston Chandler Babb. He had served as chairman of 
the history department of Furman University since 1960 and chairman of 
the Furman faculty since 1966. A native of Easley, South Carolina, he 
graduated from Furman in 1934. After deciding that a career in business 
did not provide what he wanted to give, he began graduate work at the 
University of Virginia, where he earned the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees. His 
graduate training was interrupted by service as an officer in World War 
II, after which he joined the Furman faculty in 1946. 
In addition to being an outstanding teacher, he became a distinguished 
Baptist layman and was active in civic affairs. He served as faculty chair-
man of athletics at Furman and had been president of the Southern Con-
ference since 1965. He is remembered for his humor, his open-mindedness, 
his balance, and his ability to be a friend to all who knew him and to 
reconcile opposing interests. As a teacher he stimulated students, whether 
their interest lay in graduate work, public school teaching, or careers in the 
law or business, by his concern for them as individuals. For a number of 
years he had been collecting materials for a history of his alma mater. 
Higher education in South Carolina has lost an outstanding leader. 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY0 
FREDERICK F. RITSCH 
It was the Second ·world War which shaped Jean-Paul Sartre as a man 
of social responsibility,""" although we can locate certain steps in his 
progress prior to the war. Sartre points out that as a boy he was in revolt 
against his bourgeois origins, and as a student at the I~cole Normale, he 
and his friend Paul Nizan considered themselves fully in sympathy with 
the Communist Party. Yet, while Nizan soon became a leading party 
militant, Sartre "did not feel the need" to enter politics or take a serious 
political position.1 Simone de Beauvoir writes that she, Nizan, and Sartre, 
in their discussions, "tore the bourgeoisie to shreds, tooth and nail," and 
observes that "the bourgeoisie as a class was our enemy, and we actually 
desired its liquidation."2 Sartre, himself, was not as certain of his intentions: 
"I wanted," he admits, "the order to exist . . . to be able to throw bombs 
at it-my words."3 De Beauvoir is no doubt correct when she observes 
that Sartre was motivated by a love of freedom, opposition to the established 
order of things, individualism, and respect for the working class; still, for 
over thirty years he consciously avoided political engagement, going so 
far, at the beginning of the Popular Front when he was tempted to join 
the Communist Party, as to reject the idea because his "unwritten works" 
prevented such diversions. 4 
Sartre's apolitical attitude began changing around 1936 as international 
tensions made him increasingly uneasy and fearful of a catastrophe. He 
turned impatiently to examination of newspapers and engaged more and 
more in political speculation, but, until 1938 and the Munich crisis, he 
undertook no direct action. At that time, he determined to unite his growing 
concern with his literary abilities and produce a situation literature; he 
thus embarked upon a series of novels entitled The Roads of Freedom (Les 
Chemins de la Liberte).5 Still, it was not until the next year, after the 
"Much of the research for this paper was made possible by a grant from the 
National Humanities Foundation. 
"
0 As will become evident, the term "social responsibility" is used in a Sartrean 
sense: responsibility toward other beings, and as such encompasses political, economic, 
and intellectual responsibilities. 
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, "Paul Nizan," Situations, New York, 1966: trans. by Benita 
Eisler of Situations, IV, pp. 93££. 
2 Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, London, 1962: trans. by Peter Green 
of La Force de l' Age, p. 31. 
a Sartre, p. 94. 
4 de BelliUvoir, pp. 31, lll. "We were anticapitalists, yet not Marxists," writes de 
Beauvoir. 
5 Three of the projected four novels have been completed: I, L'Age de Raison; 
II, Le Sursis; Ill, La Mart dan l' a.me. English translations: I, Age of Reason (1947); 
II, The Reprieve ( 1947); III, Troubled Sleep ( 1951). 
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Nazi attack on Poland, the French general mobilization, and, most signifi-
cantly, the rupture between Paul Nizan and the Communist Party that 
Sartre undertook a serious reconsideration of his apoliticalism. His concern 
with philosophy and literature, his rejection of bourgeois origins, and his 
sympathy for the working class which "faced the human situation in its 
true colors," now appeared as an "apprenticeship." He had been, he 
observed, "wrong about everything . . . . I discovered the monumental 
error of a whole generation-our generation-which had fallen asleep on 
its feet. They were pushing us toward massacres, across a ferocious prewar 
period, and we thought we were strolling across the lawns of Peace . . . 
finally and forever."6 Sartre had now to reintegrate himself into the real 
events of the day; the facticity of the situation was suddenly realized; ap-
peasement, both his own toward the events of the period and France's 
toward Germany, was, as he would argue in The Reprieve, merely the 
living of an unreal life centered upon the preservation of peace. And more 
disturbing, appeasement made Sartre an accessory to Hitler's persecutions 
and exterminations. 
In early February, 1940, Sartre, on furlough, met with Simone de 
Beauvoir and announced he would no longer maintain political aloofness, 
and now intended to undertake the construction of a "new morality" rooted 
in "genuineness."7 Every man, he argued, must carry the responsibility of 
his situation in life; this could be accomplished only by transcending that 
situation by engaging upon some course of action. As yet he was un-
certain of the direction of his commitment, but in a letter to Brice Parain 
written ( and never posted) soon after his meeting with de Beauvoir, 
Sartre declares: "I shall follow no leader, and if anyone wants to follow 
me, that's up to them. But the most urgent thing is to stop the young men 
who got into this war at the same age you went into the last one from 
coming out of it with 'sick' consciences."8 
In June, at the capitulation of France, Sartre was taken prisoner, and 
eventually shipped to Germany, where, until his release in 1941, he under-
went the profound experience of living, as he would describe it, as an 
object among objects attempting to retain their humanity. Much of this 
personal experience is, I feel, presented in the character of Schneider in 
Troubled Sleep, the third volume of The Roads of Freedom. Schneider 
is the somewhat mysterious intellectual who befriends the hard-core com-
munist militant, Brunet, and who sceptically helps Brunet organize a party 
structure within the camp. Schneider accuses Brunet of not really liking 
6 Sartre, "Nizan," p. 119. 
7 de Beauvoir, p. 342. 
s Ibid., pp. 342-343. 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 7 
or caring for his fellow prisoners, of viewing them as objects to be used by 
the Party. Unable to understand his friend, Brunet asks why Schneider 
has joined with the camp communists. The reply is "So as not to be alone 
. . . . A fellow has to do something, eh? It doesn't much matter what .... " 
Schneider's concern we discover is also Sartre's: how can action and indi-
vidual liberty be combined to produce a humanism? Schneider's and 
Sartre's agreement with the Party is at the level of action which we now 
see must be taken in association with others; the disagreement is with the 
lack of humanism which both Schneider and Sartre deplore in communism. 9 
Sartre returned to Paris in March, 1941, determined to act. He ap-
proached an acquaintance, the young philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
and together they organized a small resistance group designated "Socialism 
and Liberty."1° Considering themselves too inexperienced for sabotage, they 
concentrated upon making contacts and collecting intelligence. Yet, Sartre's 
real concern was with the post-war period. Anticipating a victory by the 
democracies, the group set about formulating a program for a "new Left" 
based on "Socialism and Liberty." No doubt this project evolved from 
Sartre's earlier plans for a "new morality," but the group itself soon failed 
as the inability to establish contacts with the major Resistance organizations 
combined with inexperience and increased German reprisals to convince 
Sartre of "Socialism and Liberty's" futility. Hereafter, he devoted his time 
to writing, although he did, in early 1943, associate with a Communist 
intellectuals' organization, the Comite National des Ecrivains, and con-
tributed apolitical articles to the Lettres fran9aises. 11 
Much of Sartre's time following his return from prison was devoted to 
the preparation of Being and Nothingness, 12 an essay planned for some 
time, but now revised and written to reflect the impact of Sartre's recent 
experiences. Published in 1943, the study was an original contribution in 
phenomenological ontology, but it was also a summing-up to date of 
Sartre's views on social responsibility. 
Sartre had early come to the conclusion that man is totally free to 
act, and that all acts, whatever they might be, are free acts. "Human 
9 Sartre later published two articles in Les Temps Modemes ( November and 
December 1949) entitled "Drole d'Amitie." These constitute all Sartre has completed 
on the last volume of the series. Here we discover that Schneider is actually a well-
known communist journalist named Vicarios, who has become disillusioned with the 
Party as a result of the Russo-German Pact. Schneider-Vicarios now seems based in 
large part on Sartre's friend Nizan. 
10 Sartre, "Merleau-Ponty," Situations, pp. 158-159. 
11 de Beauvoir, p. 424. 
12 L'P:.tre et le Neant, Essai d'Ontologie Phenomenilogique, Paris, 1943; all cita-
tions below are from the Hazel E. Barnes translation, Being and Nothingness, New York, 
1956. 
8 THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
reality," he writes in Being and Nothingness, "does not exist first in order 
to act later; but for human reality, to be is to act, and to cease to act is 
to cease to be."13 Thus the issue of whether or not one should become 
engaged on any particular level is rendered meaningless. "The freedom of 
the for-itself (consciousness) is always engaged," observes Sartre. "There 
is no question here of a freedom which could be undetermined and which 
would pre-exist its choice."14 The choice itself is universal, since the indi-
vidual or project, as Sartre sees each individual, is one concerning total 
being-in-the-world, not just relations with this or that particular object. 
Consequently, "the structure of choice necessarily implies that it be a choice 
in the world."15 To this point Sartre has presented nothing that could 
not be seen in his earlier works; but it soon becomes clear that the 
emphasis on total freedom is merely the first level of responsibility. Be-
tween 1938 and 1941, when he announced his determination to engage 
in political action, the implications of total freedom had become evident. 
Now Sartre realizes that, since man is condemned to be free, he "carries 
the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for 
the world and for himself as a way of being." Suddenly responsibility 
ceases to be a term for abstract contemplation, and is capable of definition 
in quite ordinary terms as "consciousness of being the incontestable author 
of an event or of an object." Responsibility assumes overwhelming impli-
cations now as each individual becomes the "one by whom it happens that 
there is a world," and each individual must accept whatever situation he 
encounters as his own creation.16 "I find myself," Sartre concludes, "sud-
denly alone and without help, engaged in a world for which I bear the 
whole responsibility without being able, whatever 1 do, to tear myself 
away from this responsibility for an instant."17 
Yet, as a free individual, can I not choose either to ignore or disclaim 
such immense and seemingly impossible responsibility? No, not if I still 
claim to be free, says Sartre. Freedom, he explains, is "the perpetual escape 
from contingency; it is the interiorization, the nihililation, and the sub-
jectivizing, which thus modified passes wholly into the gratuity of choice."18 
"To be free is to have one's freedom perpetually on trial .... "19 Sartre's 
13 Ibid., p. 476. 
14 Ibid., p. 479. Sartre continues: "We shall never apprehend ourselves except 
as a choice in the making . . . freedom is simply the fact that this choice is always 
unconditioned." 
15 Ibid., p. 480. 
10 Ibid., p. 553. 
11 Ibid., p. 556. Or, " ... this absolute responsibility is not resignation; it is 
simply the logical requirement of the consequences of our freedom" ( ibid., p . 554). 
18 Ibid., p . 479. Or, " ... freedom is defined as the escape from the given" 
( ibid., p. 485) . 
10 Ibid., p. 502. 
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responses are still inadequate. There are those who recognize the injustices 
that exist, and who also recognize that their efforts would in no way affect 
the situation; there are others too who, as realists, point out that man must 
himself through individual effort rise above his oppressed situation. Sartre 
replies with the concept of "bad faith." Bad faith "apprehends evidence 
but it is resigned in advance to not being fulfilled by this evidence, to not 
being persuaded and transformed into good faith."20 Bad faith is, then, 
flight from reality and is rooted in an "inner disintegration within the heart 
of being, and it is this disintegration which it wishes to be."2 1 Man's quest, 
says Sartre, is being and, as my starting point is the recognition of my total 
freedom, I must also recognize that I am the being through whom values 
exist. At the same time, as my consicousness is an absolute, so all individual 
consciousnesses are absolute. According to Sartre's discipline, Simone de 
Beauvoir, the result must be that "each man needs the liberty of others, 
and in a sense, he always wants it ... .''22 Thus, for Sartre, to be free means 
I must want all men to be free. This is the principle of reciprocity and 
becomes the guiding principle behind Sartre's concept of social responsi-
bility. 
Desiring to be free myself, and thus unable to avoid responsibility for 
others, "I must force the Other to be free." And in Being and Nothingness 
we find that social responsibility involves essentially the forcing of others 
to be free. 23 Concretely, this demands the effort to eliminate those arbi-
trary barriers which prevent each man from exercising his own freedom. I 
am totally responsible for their existence, and, as factual states or existing 
situations do not change of their own accord, it becomes my responsibility 
to act on the assumption that, should I not act to negate those barriers, 
they will remain forever. 
To accept authentic social responsibility, according to Sartre, one must 
identify wholly with those whose freedom is oppressed. Sartre then argues 
that the existence of class structures is the principle obstruction to freedom. 
"The 'master', the 'feudal lord,' the 'borgeois,' the 'capitalist,' all appear 
not only as powerful people who command but in addition and above all 
as Thirds; that is, as those who command but who are outside the oppressed 
community and for whom this community exists. It is therefore for them 
and in their freedom that the reality of the oppressed class is going to 
20 Sartre, Existential Psychoanalysis, New York, 1953; trans. by Hazel Barnes 
of selections from l'Etre et le Neant, p. 204. 
21 Ibid., pp. 208-209. "In bad faith there is no cynical lie, nor knowing preparation 
for deceitful concepts. But the first act of bad faith is to flee what it cannot flee, to 
flee what it is." 
22 Simone de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l'ambiquzte, Paris, 1947, p. 100. 
23 See Being and Nothingness, pp. 409-410, for discussion. 
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exist . . . . Without the Third, no matter what might be the adversity 
of the world, I should apprehend myself as a triumphant trancen-
dence . . . ."24 Without class structures, claims Sartre, we can bring 
about "a more just collective organization wherein individual possession will 
cease to be protected and sanctified at least within certain limits-this does 
not mean that the appropriative tie will cease to exist; it can remain indeed 
by virtue of a private relation of men to things."25 
Being and Nothingness thus allows us to establish the reasoning under-
lying Sartre's concept of social responsibility, and to identify individual 
freedom and reciprocity as its pillars. Moreover, it should be noted that 
Sartre considers himself in search of a "true" humanism, a humanism in 
opposition to that explained by liberalism as stemming from natural 
rights.26 One's rights, he contends, are not natural; they are human. 
Sartre has also revealed for us a concrete goal, the classless society, which, 
while such a society does not guarantee human freedom, it will approxi-
mate a situation allowing freedom. Consequently, Sartre sides with the 
proletariat-the "oppressed class"-against the bourgeoisie and capitalist. 
Sartre next undertakes to outline the concrete form of social responsi-
bility; i.e., individual responsibility in actual practice. Man, he explains, 
immersed in the historical situation cannot succeed in conceiving of the 
failures and lackings in a political organization or determined economy; this 
is not due to habit, but rather because an alternative situation is unimagin-
able. Responsibility thus lies in explaining to the oppressed the failures and 
lacks of the established order. Specifically, "it is the organized form-
worker-finding-his-suffering-natural-which must be surmounted and de-
nied in order for it to be able to form the object of a revealing contempla-
tion."27 More simply put, the proletariat must be forced to recognize that 
its present oppression lies in its acceptance of the existing situation; such 
a realization brings about a partial negation which then permits the pro-
letariat to sense the existence of a more just alternative.28 The implications 
here are plain: responsibility demands the promotion of a condition 
conducive to a social revolution, the word revolution here being used to 
denote a violent negation of the existing order. 
24 Ibid., p. 421. "Thus, the oppressed class finds its class unity in the knowledge 
which the oppressing class has of it, and the appearance among the oppressed of class 
consciousness corresponds to the assumption in shame of an Us-object.' 
25 Ibid., pp. 586-587. 
26 See ibid., pp. 452-453. 
21 Ibid., p. 436. 
28 Sartre observes that one must encourage the proletarian consciousness to effect 
"a rupture with its own past," a "wrenching itself away from its past so as to be able 
to consider it[self] in the light of a non-being and so as to be able to confer on it[self] 
the meaning which it has in terms of the project of a meaning which it does not have." 
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It is now evident that, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre's earlier interest 
in the construction of a "new morality" has been replaced by an immediate 
responsibility of action to bring about revolution. The "new morality" 
project, undoubtedly the study in existential ethics which philosophers 
hoped would follow Being and Nothingness, has assumed, within the book, 
a questionable validity as a result of Sartre's explanation of responsibility. 
By 1945, it was apparent that Sartre was no longer interested in exploring 
metaphysical freedom for those who lack real freedom. The immediate 
objective in a world he found unjust was social revolution, after which one 
could turn to discussions of metaphysical freedom. 
Whether Sartre intended it or not, Being and Nothingness laid the ground-
work for a necessary confrontation with Marxism. The oppressed class, the 
proletariat, views the oppressor, the bourgeoisie, across a material barrier 
which the latter has erected, and which, for the oppressed to become free, 
must be removed by revolutionary action. Existentialism, especially an 
existential ethic, can not provide a satisfactory explanation for this, and 
it appears throughout Being and Nothingness that Sartre can complete his 
argument only by turning to Marxism for assistance. 
Sartre maintained that each man in search of authentic liberty must 
accept a responsibility for action through his choice within his situation. 
Contingency made Sartre a Frenchman of bourgeois origins; his choice 
was to be a writer. In fact, the more Sartre concentrated his thought upon 
the nature of responsibility, the more he came to view writing as the most 
perfect means for fulfilling this responsibility. "The engaged writer," he 
observed, "knows that words are action,"29 and he maintained that as 
early as 1941 he had discovered through the freedom of writing all other 
freedoms.30 The writer is, he felt, "par excellence, a mediator and his 
engagement is mediation."31 As such, the writer seeks to become the 
"conscience" of the oppressed; he must give society a "guilty conscience."32 
The writer in good faith is, said Sartre, in a state of perpetual antagonism 
toward the conservative forces which are maintaining the balance he tends 
to upset. Further, the writer's ultimate goal, if he has chosen social 
responsibility, must be the classless society, since "literature can only 
realize its full essence in a classless society" ( wherein the writer becomes 
mediator for all).33 It is not surprising then that in 1943, with Being and 
Nothingness completed, Sartre set his sights upon a journal devoted to the 
task of the writer's responsibility. 
29 Sartre, "Qu'est-ce que la litterature?" Situations, II, Paris, 1948, p. 73. 
so Sartre, "Merleau-Ponty," Situations, pp. 158-159. 
31 Sartre, "Qu'est-ce que la litterature?" Situations, II, p. 124. 
32 Ibid., pp. 127, 129. 
33 Ibid., p. 197. 
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In 1945, Les Temps Modernes, Sartre's journal of responsibility, was 
inaugurated in Paris. Sartre, now an intellectual of solid reputation, was 
Director. Behind him was an editorial board composed of such impressive 
figures as Raymond Aron, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Simone de Beauvoir. 
The "Presentation" of the new journal, written by Sartre, was intended as 
a statement of editorial board agreement on the journal's purpose. In fact, 
the "Presentation" was Sartre's and represented the direction of his 
thoughts and set the goals he has sought through Les Temps Modernes 
since 1945. 
Sartre begins the "Presentation" with a recognition of his own past 
difficulty in defining responsibility: "Every writer of bourgeois origin 
has known the temptation of irresponsibility . . . ."84 The Occupation 
has, however, revealed that "the writer is situated in his epoch; each word 
has reverberations."85 The writer thus has come to recognize that through 
words he is acting upon his time, and must choose, therefore, to act with 
responsibility. The collaborators of Les Temps Modernes hold, declares 
Sartre, that man is an absolute, but what must be made clear is that he is 
absolute at this moment, in this milieu, and that all decisions taken at this 
moment are absolute with regard to the circumstances. The journal will 
be devoted to the effort to glimpse those eternal values implied in the 
social and political debates of the day.86 
One immediately senses an uneasiness with Sartre's line of thought. If 
man is absolute, is it not true that the individual philosopher, or, as the 
case may be, writer for Les Temps Modernes, is absolute when viewed 
within his time. For Sartre, the answer is yes, and it was for this reason 
that the collaborators of Les Temps Modernes were required to accept that 
one's external position should be fully in harmony with freedom's resolve, 
and one should thus seek an absolute reply to the whole of the situation 
in which one is. This meant the writers for Les Temps Modernes could be-
long to no church or party ("one who is bound to a certain group is no longer 
able to reflect on anything") .37 This, for Sartre, is the self-affirmation of 
a freedom which maintains its position above involvement. Absolute 
positions are thus assumed, not because of the values of choices, but as 
testimony to one's freedom. This absolutist tendency of Sartre's thinking 
was not shared by his collaborators at Les Temps Modernes, all of whom 
would eventually withdraw from the editorial board. Sartre, observed Mer-
leau-Ponty, who remained with Sartre longer than most, was limited by his 
34 Sartre, "Presentation des Temps Modernes," Situations, II, p. 9. 
85 Ibid., p. 13. 
36 Ibid., p. 15. 
87 See ibid., pp. 28-30. 
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"cursed lucidity," and tended to view his own experiences from the stand-
point of his absolute freedom, and, consequently, reduced all problems to 
either-or situations in which one's choice must be absolute.38 For Merleau-
Ponty, such an approach was untenable considering the ambiguity that 
pervaded all problems. 
Sartre spends considerable time in the "Presentation" in explaining his 
particular project as a responsible writer. Absolute man, he states, reveals 
himself through his dialectical structure; i.e., his being shaped by and his 
shaping of his milieu. Unfortunately, this true view of man, made possible 
by the dialectical method, is prevented in the contemporary world by the 
fact that the dominant view of Western man is the doctrine of bourgeois 
democracy. This doctrine is based on what Sartre calls the analytical 
method or "spirit of analysis" which stems from the eighteenth century 
emphasis on natural rights as the bases for freedoms. From this, the 
bourgeoisie has constructed the "myth of the universal" whereby all men are 
alike. This permits the bourgeois to act as an individual addressing a 
universal human nature. At first glance it would appear that the analytical 
method secures the individual; however, this is only a "mask" since the 
bourgeois "persists in seeing only men, in proclaiming identity with human 
nature across all varieties of the situation." In other words, men, all alike, 
are juxtaposed, all equally subject to the analytical method, thus able to 
be defined, classified, and categorized. The concept of the living dialectic, 
of the principle of reciprocity which ties man to man, is missing. The 
analytical method refuses to view man as a free creativity, and, as such, 
responsible for his fellow man ( it "excludes perception of collective 
realities"). Thus, while the individual is admittedly protected, man is 
separated. Sartre goes much farther than mere differing with the doctrine 
of bourgeois democracy; the myth, he believes, has become a desperate 
weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie: "We are," he writes, "convinced 
that the spirit of analysis has conquered and that its unique effort is today 
to confuse the revolutionary conscience and to isolate men to the profit 
of the privileged classes."39 In the interest of total man, we must, declares 
Sartre, replace the analytical method with the dialectical method. What 
men have in common is not nature, but a metaphysical condition, by which 
the significant and uniting factors are not natural rights but a priori 
limitations such as the necessity of birth and death, of existing and ending 
in the world in the midst of other men. The dialectical method allows man 
to recognize his relationship to all men, and not his separateness. Sartre 
38 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, Paris, 1960, p. 33. Merleau-Ponty continues: 
one comes to suspect what is after all likely, that there is only one Sartre." 
39 See Sartre's "Presentation," pp. 18-20. 
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Is here seeking a new synthesis which, while taking into account the 
analytical method, emphasizes the dialectical, and this he establishes as 
his project in life. 40 
With the "Presentation" Sartre had completed his development and 
explanation of a personal program for social responsibility; henceforth, the 
problems of clarification and application will dominate his thinking, and he 
will always assume for himself a position of "good faith." From his 
original observation that each individual is totally responsible for his 
choices, Sartre has progressed through several stages. Until around 1938, 
he viewed responsibility as wholly individual. His responsibility was es-
sentially to himself as a free creativity through his project. It is true that he 
considered his project as the exposing of contradictions existing within' the 
bourgeois society with the purpose of benefiting those he considered 
oppressed. Such a project would certainly identify him as a social critic 
or moralist, and, perhaps, carried to the extreme, as a revolutionary agitator. 
But Sartre then pressed beyond this to a next level where he, as a free 
creativity, experienced a sense of total responsibility ( as opposed to a 
sense of guilt for bourgeois origins) for the existing situation. It was 
therefore necessary to assume a responsibility which extended to all men in 
all situations, and which demanded direct and constant action. Thus, 
between 1938 and 1943, Sartre expanded his concept of social responsibility 
by the addition of reciprocity undergirded by freedom and unavoidable 
engagement, and dreamed of a "new morality" rooted in authentic liberty. 
Yet, as a result of his own inability to form a successful Resistance 
organization in the face of the particular interests of the major Resistance 
groups, combined with the political confusion that descended upon France 
at the Liberation, and the general fear evoked by the American usage of 
the atom bomb, Sartre foresook his optimism that the post-war peace would 
bring on an era when men would demand new alternatives to prevent 
future wars. Undoubtedly there was considerable naivete in his concept 
of a "new morality," and by 1944 and 1945 Sartre had concluded that the 
peace would not alter the situation he found unjust. "This is not Peace," he 
writes in 1945. "Peace is a beginning . . . . Today we recognize our 
error: the end of the war is merely the end of this war."41 Yet, at least a 
new state of mind had been created: "The war, in ending, leaves man 
naked, without illusions, abandoned to his own strengths, having finally 
understood that he can count only on himself."42 This disillusionment was 
40 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
41 "La Fin de la Guerre (Les Temps Modernes, Oct. 1945)," Situations, III, Paris, 
1949, p. 66. 
42Jbid., p. 71. 
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the raw material of social revolution, and Sartre urged that the moment be 
seized upon to bring about the negation of European bourgeois society. 
The moment is now undoubtedly past, and it is evident that Sartre has 
failed in the long run to inspire action through the revelation to men of 
their responsibilities as Sartre sees them. 43 Either Sartre has been thor-
oughly wrong or he has failed to communicate; more likely, a little of both 
is true. In the 1930's, Sartre wanted to throw bombs-his words-at the 
existing order; he has certainly done this, but while the explosions have 
often wrought consternation among his enemies, they have apparently 
gone unobserved among those who were to have benefited. What he has 
left us from his early political thought is an interesting, in many ways 
seemingly valid, and very humanistic analysis of individual responsibility 
toward oneself and others in the contemporary world. 
43 Sartre still carries on the project of his "Presentation," and the Critique de la 
Raison Dialectique ( Paris, 1960) includes an elaborate clarification concerning the 
distinction between the "dialectical" and the "analytical." 
THE LAST CAMPAIGN OF MAJOR PATRICK FERGUSON 
ROBERT D. BAss0 
As soon as Major Patrick Ferguson, the commanding officer of the Loyal 
American Volunteers and of the Loyalist Militia encamped on Fair 
Forest Creek, learned of the battle of Camden and the destruction of the 
American Army under General Gates, he rode down to the headquarters of 
Lord Cornwallis. Ferguson remained in Camden for a week, listening to 
his Lordship's plans for the invasion of North Carolina. On September 1 
he returned to his troops on Fair Forest Creek. "Major Ferguson joined us 
again from Camden with the disagreeable news that we were to be sep-
arated from the army," Lieutenant Anthony Allaire wrote in his Diary, "and 
act on the frontiers with the militia." 
The next morning Major Ferguson began preparing to march from 
Fair Forest. He planned to move up to the boundary line between the 
Carolinas and dawdle along it until Lord Cornwallis could reach Charlotte. 
Finally he had his corps ready to start. "Got in motion at eleven o'clock in 
the morning," Allaire noted on September 2: "forded Fair Forest river, and 
marched ten miles to the Iron Works, on Lawson's Fork of Pacolet River." 
Ferguson and his troops remained at Wofford's Iron Works for two days 
and on September 5 reached the Pacolet. Here they halted. "The fresh 
was so high we could not ford the river," Allaire wrote in his Diary. On 
the seventh, however, he wrote, "got in motion at seven o'clock in the 
morning; crossed Buck Creek, and the division line of South and North 
Carolina." 
After marching six miles farther into North Carolina, the major halted 
his corps and formed a camp. At six o'clock in the evening he chose fifty 
American volunteers and three hundred militiamen. Leaving the rest of 
his troops in camp under the command of Captain Abraham DePeyster, he 
began a rapid march to Gilbert Town in an attempt to surprise Colonel 
Charles McDowell. 
Major Ferguson failed to find McDowell, and for the next three days 
he and his detachment lay encamped at Gilbert Town. During his stay he 
paroled a backwater Whig named Samuel Philips. He instructed Philips 
" Professor of English at Erskine College, Due West, S. C. 
"The Last Campaign of Major Patrick Ferguson" is a condensed section from the 
author's manuscript entitled Ninety Six: A Chronicle of Strife in the Backwoods. The 
chief source is the unpublished correspondence of Lord Cornwallis. The second source 
is L~an D. Drapers King's Mountain and its Heroes ( Cincinnati, 1881). In his 
Kings Mountain Draper published "Diary of Lieut. Anthony Allaire," a valuable docu-
ment for tracing the day by day movements of Major Ferguson. 
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to tell the Whig colonels on the Wautauga, Nolachucky, and Holston rivers 
that if they continued in rebellion, he would lead his troops across the 
Blue Ridge, capture and hang them, and then destroy their settlements 
with fire and sword. 
Upon reaching home Philips reported Ferguson's threat to Colonel 
Isaac Shelby. Shelby immediately began to spread an alarm over the 
threatened invasion. He rode over to Jonesboro and found Colonel John 
Sevier watching a horse-race. During the excitement of the races the two 
agreed to arouse the leaders of the Whig militia, join McDowell, and strike 
Ferguson and his Tories before they could join the British forces in 
Charlotte. 
The colonels agreed on a coordinated movement. Sevier promised to 
enlist the cooperation of Colonels Charles McDowell, Andrew Hampton, 
and John Carter. Shelby set off to secure the cooperation of Colonel 
William Campbell of Washington County, Virginia. 
After some delay, on September 22 Colonel Campbell with Colonel 
Arthur Campbell, a brother-in-law, and their mounted militia set off down 
the Holston River toward a rendezvous with the other backwater men at 
Sycamore Shoals on the Wautauga. Colonel William Campbell also sent 
an emissary to invite Colonel Benjamin Cleveland to march the militia of 
Wilkes County to a proposed concentration at Burke County Court House. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Patrick Ferguson was indefatigable. He returned to DePeyster's camp, 
selected forty American Volunteers, whom he placed under Captain James 
Dunlap, and a hundred militiamen. With these, at two o'clock on the 
morning of September 12, he set out toward Cane Creek in a second 
attempt to surprise McDowell. 
But Colonel Charles McDowell was just as vigilant. As soon as 
Ferguson marched, McDowell's scouts galloped back to his camp. And 
so he moved his Whigs up to Cane Creek and set an ambush at the upper 
crossing. Ferguson marched straight into the trap, but McDowell's men 
had become nervous and fired prematurely. As the Whigs struggled to 
reload their guns in the dark, the Loyalists charged with fixed bayonets 
and cut their way to Cane Creek. Captain Dunlap was twice wounded 
while leading the American Volunteers in the charge. 
After the skirmish on Cane Creek, Ferguson marched his detachment 
back to Gilbert Town. McDowell moved on to the headwaters of the 
Catawba. From these positions the Scotsman and the Whig continued to 
spar. 
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With a detachment of 350 American Volunteers and militiamen, 
Ferguson made a second foray along Cane Creek. After a fruitless search, 
he marched a detachment of his American Volunteers and five hundred 
militiamen on to the Catawba in another effort to surprise Colonel 
McDowell. But again the Whig had decamped. Tired of Ferguson's 
pursuit, he had crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains and was safely en-
camped among the backwater men gathering on Wautauga River. 
Ferguson halted on the Catawba and his men encamped in the Whig 
community of Pleasant Gardens. Forgetting McDowell, for the next five 
days Major Ferguson kept his troops beating around the headwaters of 
the Catawba. He spread them over the countryside to eat out and destroy 
the plantations of the V/higs. And on September 20, three officers from 
Cruger's corps marched into his camp with fifty militiamen from Ninety Six. 
Having cleared the country east of the Blue Ridge of Whig horsemen, 
on September 23 Major Ferguson marched his troops back and encamped 
at Gilbert Town. Next morning five hundred North Carolina militiamen, 
some bringing their wives to camp, rode in from loyal communities in 
Tryon County. 
While Major Ferguson was busy integrating the fresh North Carolina 
militia into his corps, a courier galloped into his camp with letters from 
Colonel Cruger in Ninety Six. Cruger had written that Colonel Elijah 
Clarke and some six hundred Georgians had attacked Colonel Thomas 
Browne's troops in Augusta. Fortunately, the Cherokee Indians had delayed 
Clarke long enough for Browne to collect his troops in Fort Cornwallis. 
Clarke had besieged the fort for five days, the last two of which the 
defenders were without bread or water. But Thomas Browne, his toasted 
feet still aching, was of heroic temper. He was still holding firm when 
Colonels Cruger and Allen, with their regiments from DeLancey's and 
Skinner's brigades, marched down from Ninety Six, surprised Clarke, and 
drove him from Augusta. 
Cruger was certain that Clarke would lead his horsemen up the 
Savannah, skirt the Blue Ridge, and try to join the concentration on the 
Wautauga. He warned Ferguson to be on guard and to try to meet Clarke 
in the maze of creeks and rivers south of Gilbert Town. 
For the next four days, Major Ferguson remained at Gilbert Town, 
incorporating the North Carolinians in his corps and maneuvering his 
troops to the sound of his silver whistle. But on September 27 Tory scouts 
warned him that Clarke and his horsemen were moving northward along 
the roads east of the Blue Ridge. 
At five o'clock on the morning of September 28 Ferguson started his 
corps of about a thousand men on their march to meet Clarke. They 
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paused briefly at Twitty's Ford on Broad River and at McDaniel's Ford on 
Green River before halting at "one James Step's plantation." On September 
30, Lieutenant Allaire wrote, "Lay at James Steps with an expectation of 
intercepting Colonel Clarke on his return to the mountains; but he was 
prudent enough to take another route." 
After having missed Clarke, Major Ferguson began a retrogade march 
toward the British Army. "Got in motion at five o'clock in the morning, and 
marched twelve miles to Denard's Ford of Broad River," Allaire wrote on 
October 1, "and took up our old ground where we lay the 8th of September." 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
The Whig colonels spent a week at Sycamore Shoals. On September 
27 they were ready to begin their campaign against Ferguson and his 
corps of Loyalists. So they started their horsemen up the trail between 
Roan and Yellow mountains. Soft snow covered the pass, but as Ensign 
Robert Campbell wrote in his Diary, "on the summit, there were about a 
hundred acres of beautiful table-land, in which a spring issued, ran 
through it, and over into the Wautuauga." Upon reaching this table land 
the colonels held a parade. During the excitement militiamen James 
Crawford and Samuel Chambers deserted and set out to find Major 
Ferguson. 
After heightening the morale of their men, the colonels began the 
descent along Roan Mountain. On September 29 they passed through 
Gillespie's Gap and reached the Catawba. Next day, September 30, ad-
vanced detachments reached and encamped at Quaker Meadows, the 
plantation of Colonel Charles McDowell. 
On October 1 all of the Whig horsemen reached Quaker Meadows. 
With volunteer militiamen from Virginia, Georgia, and North and South 
Carolina, the colonels felt that they needed a commander-in-chief. To 
prevent any bickering, they voted to make Colonel William Campbell 
their commanding officer. Soon after his election, Colonel Campbell 
marched the backwater men to Gilbert Town. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
By October 1 Major Ferguson was hearing increasing rumors that 
a powerful body of American horsemen were trailing his corps. And so 
from Denard's he reported the movement of the backwater Whigs to Lord 
Cornwallis. Ferguson also informed his Lordship that he was moving 
his corps toward Charlotte. 
In his headquarters in Charlotte Cornwallis was not perturbed by the 
mustering of the Whigs from the Wautuaga and the Holston. He was more 
anxious for the safety of Ninety Six. He answered that Ferguson's first 
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objective should be "to afford every assistance in your power to Colonel 
Cruger." 
His Lordship, however, did warn Ferguson of a movement of South 
Carolinians against him. "I am informed," he wrote, "that Colonel Williams 
and part of Sumter's corps marched yesterday from Sherrald's Ford, giving 
out that they were going against you." 
"Sumter has had a quarrel with Williams about command," his Lord-
ship wrote Ferguson, relaying information derived from his secret intelli-
gence, "and has gone to Hillsboro to refer it to Gates." 
Through his espionage service Lord Cornwallis had accurate daily 
reports on the movements of the Americans, and he was correct in his 
report on Brigadier General James Williams. On October 2 Williams and 
some four hundred and fifty horsemen bivouacked in the fork of Catawba 
and Little Catawba rivers. From there the brigadier wrote to Major 
General Horatio Gates. He reported that McDowell and Shelby with 
fifteen hundred mountain men had crossed the Blue Ridge. Colonel 
Cleveland with eight hundred militiamen from Sullivan County, North 
Carolina, was marching toward a junction with them at Burke Court 
House. 
"I expect to join them tomorrow, in pursuit of Colonel Ferguson," 
Presbyterian Elder Williams wrote, "and under the direction of heaven, 
I hope to render your honor a good account of him in a few days." 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
A relentless drillmaster and a perfectionist, Ferguson was thoroughly 
dissatisfied with his Loyalist militia. They needed more marching, drilling, 
and training. And so at Denard's he turned back, forded Broad River, 
marched four miles to an old field, and fo1med his men into a battle line. 
There he kept them in formation and alert until daybreak. 
As soon as his troops could see on the road, he started forward again. 
They slogged along, fording branches, creeks, and rivers, and about sunset 
on the evening of October 3 they formed a bivouac on the Tate plantation 
east of Buffalo Creek. 
That evening, October 3, Ferguson wrote a report to Lord Cornwallis. 
"I advanced last night over Broad River," he said in his letter; "marched 
20 miles to Little Broad River-toward any reinforcements your Lordship 
may send-Enemy 20 miles away at Gilbert Town." 
Patrick Ferguson's commission in the British Army was that of major 
in the 71st Regiment. He had been a favorite of Sir Henry Clinton, and Sir 
Henry had issued him commissions as Lieutenant Colonel of the Loyal 
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American Volunteers and major in the Loyalist militia in South Carolina. 
But Ferguson knew that he was not held in such high esteem by Lord 
Cornwallis. So his correspondence became defensive and apologetic. 
He wrote that he had tried to integrate the inexperienced militiamen 
of North Carolina with the American Volunteers and the militia from 
Ninety Six. He was not succeeding, and he appealed for understanding. 
"The constant hurry in which I am kept by the irregularitys [sic] and the ig-
norance of every person belonging to the militia will, I hope, excuse me to 
your Lordship for the incorrectness of my correspondence." 
The major was worried about protecting the farm boys that he had 
embodied in his corps. "I have asked Colonel Cruger to send me 100 
soldiers and some militia, but they will come late," he informed Cornwallis. 
In the meantime he was going to advance beyond Cherokee Ford and 
"take a strong ground till I know exactly the several detachments of the 
enemy that have joined." 
And then with the courage he had displayed at Brandywine, Patrick 
Ferguson scrawled with his left hand: "At any rate rather give than receive 
an attack." 
For two days Major Ferguson, with his American Volunteers, and his 
corps of militiamen, remained at Tate's. He was now certain that the 
backwater Whigs were concentrating for an attack on his troops. He was 
personally unafraid, but he was uncertain about the outcome of a battle 
with the Americans. 
Ferguson knew that in battle his American Volunteers would be as 
steady as veteran regulars. He believed that the South Carolinians whom he 
had been marching and drilling since early July were ready. But he also 
knew that the North Carolinians, whom he had embodied during his 
march around Gilbert Town, were green, undisciplined, and poorly armed. 
He feared that they were not yet ready for battle. 
After struggling with these problems for several days, with reports of 
the Whig concentration growing ominous, Ferguson decided to appeal 
directly to Lord Cornwallis. He needed several hundred regular British 
troops to give morale and greater fighting power to his corps of militiamen. 
But he knew that reinforcement would bring even greater problems. Should 
his Lordship send the troops commanded by Lord Rawdon, Colonel Tarle-
ton, or Major McArthur, all senior in the British Army, this officer would 
take command of the entire corps, including the militia. And once vic-
torious, this officer would gain promotion, rank, and glory. 
So Patrick Ferguson asked for troops, but not for a senior officer. He 
wanted the glory of defeating the backwater Whigs. 
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Buffalo Creek, Oct. 5th, 1780 
My Lord: 
A doubt does not remain with regard to the intelligence I have sent 
your Lordship. They are since joined by Clark and Sumpter. Of course 
are become an object of some consequence. Happily their leaders are 
obliged to feed their followers with such storys, and so to flatter them with 
accounts of our weakness and fear, that if necessary, I should hope for 
success against them myself. But numbers compared that must be but 
doubtful. I am on my march towards you by a road from Cherokee Ford 
north of King's Mountain. 3 or 400 good soldiers part dragoons would 
finish the business. Something must be done soon. This is their last push 
in this quarter and they are extremely desolate and awed. 
I wish for your Lordship's orders. 
If your Lordship should be pleased not to supersede me by sending a 
superior officer, it will be an addition to the obligations I owe you, 
altho not to the gratitude with which I am, 
Lord Cornwallis 
My Lord 
Your Lordship's Most Obedient Servant 
Patrick Ferguson 
Major 71 Reg't. 
Because of Ferguson's pessimistic reports, Lord Cornwallis was 
becoming discouraged over his plan to organize a powerful Loyalist 
militia to reinforce his army or to take over and hold the reconquered 
Southern states. Realizing that the militia could not defend themselves 
against the backwater Whigs, his Lordship ordered Ferguson to march 
to Arness Ford below the fork of Little Catawba and Catawba Rivers. 
"I would have you come to Arness Ford just below the forks," he 
wrote the major on October 5. "If we can then fix the enemy or if they 
presume to pass on towards Ninety Six I will detach in force against them. 
Take all possible pains to get intelligence and let me hear when you arrive 
at Arness Ford. Major McArthur will meet you there." 
His Lordship then ordered Major McArthur to march the 71st Regiment 
from the Waxhaws and encamp them at Arness Ford. And he told Mc-
Arthur, "It is possible that you may meet with or hear of Ferguson." 
His Lordship then settled back to a long, chatty letter to Colonel 
Balfour. "Ferguson assures me that a lar_ge body of rebels are coming 
over the mountain under Shelby and McDowell, 1,500 or 2,000," he informed 
Balfour. "The corps lately commanded by Sumter is gone up the Catawba 
to meet them." He then noted that he had sent McArthur to Arness Ford. 
Turning to his coding wheel, Lord Cornwallis then confided to Balfour 
in secret code: "This business must delay us. I may probably be obliged 
to strike some blow that way. My present plan is when I have cleared our 
flanks to advance to Salisbury; stay there long enough to give our friends 
time to join; and then march to Cross Creek, raise the Highlanders, and 
communicate with our shipping." 
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Next morning Lord Cornwallis continued his informal, gossipy cor-
respondence with the officers whom he had left to hold South Carolina. He 
wrote Cruger that a large body of rebels were concentrating to attack 
Ferguson, and his Lordship warned him not to risk the safety of Ninety 
Six. "If anything in force marches your way," he wrote, "I will take care 
to be soon after them." 
A few minutes later Major Ferguson's courier arrived at headquarters 
and delivered his letters to Cornwallis. "I received your letter of the 3rd 
and am still of opinion you should come to Arness Ford to which place 
Major McArthur has orders to proceed from Waxhaws," his Lordship 
replied. "If the enemy should presume to come down to the lower part of 
Tryon County, Tarleton shall pass at some of the upper fords and clear 
the country. For the present both he and his corps want a few days of 
rest." 
Banastre Tarleton, slowly recovering from yellow fever, had told Lord 
Cornwallis that he was too ill and weak to lead the British Legion to the 
rescue of Ferguson. , 
"' "' "' "' "' "' 
During the night Ferguson's courier reached Tate's with letters from 
Lord Cornwallis. Bouyed by the promise that Tarleton and his British 
Legion would cut in behind the backwater men and that McArthur and 
his old comrades in the 71st Regiment would meet him at Arness Ford, 
Ferguson and his troops broke camp on October 6 and set off toward the 
fork of the Catawbas. 
After Major Ferguson and his corps had reached and begun moving 
along the road from Cherokee to Arness Ford, he became aware of and 
interested in a mountain that rose almost like a pillar from the surrounding 
country. As he surveyed the hundred foot peak, apparently as inaccessible 
as that on which stood Edinburgh Castle in his native Scotland, he ordered 
his men to turn aside from the main road and follow the guides up the 
wagon road to the top of Little King's Mountain. 
With his tired, struggling militiamen encamped on top of Little 
King's Mountain, Patrick Ferguson considered his position secure. With 
Tarleton and his dragoons in Charlotte, only 35 miles away, and McArthur 
and his Highlanders at Arness Ford, only 25 miles away, he could hold the 
mountain until the arrival of reinforcements. 
So Major Ferguson walked among his tired men, bragging, boasting, 
and trying to boost their morale. But the major wounded the religious 
sensibilities of the Presbyterians and Baptists by exclaiming, "God Al-
mighty can't get me off this mountain!" 
L.___~_ 
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Even though tired, like a dutiful junior officer, Major Patrick Ferguson 
then began his report to Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis. 
My Lord, 
I arrived today at Kings Mountain and have taken a post where I do 
not think I can be forced by a stronger enemy than that against us. 
I have wrote for the militia assembling under Colonel Floyd to join 
me tomorrow evening if not destined for another service. 
I understand that we have little or no reinforcement to expect from 
Colonel Crnger or his militia immediately. Good soldiers as reserves be-
hind our riflemen and a few real Dragoons to second with effect and 
support the Friends of Horse militia upon the Enemy's flanks would enable 
us to act decisively and vigorously; as it is with Colonel Floyd we do not 
think ourselves inferior to the enemy if you are pleased to order us 
forward; but help so near at hand, it appeared somewhat improper of 
myself to commit anything to hazards. 
I have the honor to be with the greatest respect, 
KingsMountain 
Oct. 6, 1760 
Pat Ferguson 
Major of 71 Regt. 
As Whigs continued to join his force early on October 5 Colonel 
Campbell marched from Gilbert Town. Information from scouts and private 
sources indicated that Ferguson was retreating toward Ninety Six. So 
Campbell followed the trail of the Tories down to Broad River, crossed at 
Denard's Ford, and moved on to the camping ground at the Cowpens. 
At the Cowpens, Campbell learned that Ferguson .had turned aside 
from the road to Ninety Six and headed toward Charlotte. From the 
slowness of their march the Tories should have reached King's Mountain. 
Campbell called a council of war. 
At the Cowpens, Brigadier General James Williams had joined the 
Whigs, and his appearance had brought up the question of command. The 
partisanship and animosity between the followers of Williams and Sumter, 
however, prevented General Williams from asserting his seniority. In 
council all the colonels voted to retain Colonel William Campbell as their 
commander, "In courtesy," said Colonel William Hill, "to him and his 
regiment, who had marched the greatest distance." And although it was 
raining, with Broad River already flooding, the councilors agreed to 
choose the men with the best horses, cross the Broad at Cherokee Ford, 
and follow Ferguson toward King's Mountain. 
About nine o'clock Campbell and his horsemen left the Cowpens. In 
the rain and darkness, the guides lost their way, and the cold, wet horsemen 
had advanced only five miles before daylight. Soon after sunrise they 
reached the Broad, crossed the Cherokee Ford, and headed up the old 
Cherokee trading path toward King's Mountain. As rain continued to 
pour during the forenoon, Campbell decided to halt and go into bivouac. 
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"I will not stop until night," exclaimed Colonel Shelby, "even if I follow 
Ferguson into the lines of Cornwallis." 
About noon the autumnal rain stopped, and the weather became clear 
and warm. As the horsemen followed the trail, there were mounting 
signs that they were closing in on their quarry. When they neared King's 
Mountain, Colonel Campbell stopped at the home of a Tory and asked 
about Ferguson. A young woman pointed to the craggy eminence, only 
three miles away, and said, "He is on that mountain." 
Calling the Whig colonels in for a final council, Campbell set forth 
his tactics. The backwater men would move as near as possible to the top 
of Little King's Mountain. They would then try to surround Ferguson's 
corps. 
As the mountaineers moved forward, they captured several straggling 
Tories. They also met a paroled Whig. From these Colonel Campbell 
ascertained the exact position of the British. He then formed his horsemen 
into two columns, with Colonel Cleveland at the head of the left column 
and himself at the head of the right. In this formation they started their 
advance and by good fortune surprised and captured the Loyalist pickets 
before they could fire an alarm. 
- Near King's Creek, Colonel Campbell halted the advancing columns. 
He ordered the Whigs to dismount and tether their horses. "Fresh prime 
your guns," yelled Campbell, adding grimly, "and every man go into battle 
firmly resolving to fight till he dies!" 
The columns of tired, hungry, but eager Whigs began moving up the 
eastern slope of Little King's Mountain. "They moved up a branch and a 
ravine, between two rocky knobs," said General Joseph Graham long 
afterward, "beyond which the top of the mountain and the enemy's camp 
upon it were in full view." The backwater Whigs had found Patrick 
Ferguson. 
Unaware of the approaching Whigs, and with only a squad of militia-
men guarding his camp, Patrick Ferguson waited for the detachment from 
Charlotte to arrive and escort him and his straggling militiamen to Arness 
Ford. From there he could maneuver under the protection of the British 
Army. 
About four o'clock Campbell and Shelby moved their backwater men 
into the clearing below Ferguson's camp. As soon as they came into 
position, the Whigs began firing into the Tory guards. Instantly Ferguson 
shouted to Captain DePeyster and the American Volunteers, "Give them 
the bayonet!" 
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As the Volunteers went charging down hill, their merciless bayonets 
gleaming in the October sun, the backwater men hesitated, then moved 
back, and finally fled to their comrades still in the woods. With his silver 
whistle Ferguson recalled the Volunteers and sent them back into position 
in front of his militia. 
Schooled in tactics then prevalent in Europe, Patrick Ferguson placed 
his greatest confidence in the cold, glittering bayonet. But he was also a 
rifleman and a former commander of riflemen. He knew how to use the 
Tory riflemen, and so he concealed a company of sharpshooters behind 
the rocks along the southwest edge of the clearing. He posted another 
squad behind the wagons on the summit. Soon these men from the Fair 
Forest were wreaking havoc among the backwater Whigs. 
The hot little skirmish between the backwater men and the American 
Volunteers lasted only ten minutes. During this time, however, the rest 
of the Whigs were moving into position around the summit of Little 
King's Mountain like Cherokees closing in for a ring fight. Caught in a 
withering fire from the encirclement the Loyalist militia began retreating. 
To rescue them, Major Ferguson ordered the American Volunteers sup-
ported by the militiamen from Ninety Six into a second bayonet charge. 
Yelling, racing, and flashing their English bayonets, the Volunteers fol-
lowed Captain DePeyster and Lieutenant Allaire down the slope. But 
this time the Wigs did not panic. They merely gave way, moving to 
safety behind rocks, stumps and trees. 
General Williams then threw his riflemen into an attack. Under their 
fire DePeyster and his men climbed uphill. Near the summit they wheeled 
and charged again. Seeing the cold, glistening bayonets, Williams's militia-
men quickly slithered to safety. 
While Ferguson's American Volunteers were withdrawing after their 
charge, Colonel Shelby moved on to the north and brought his men to 
rest on the right of the men under General Williams. To his right were 
Colonel Sevier and his riflemen from the Wautauga. As these Whigs gained 
their positions among the trees and crags, safe from Tory musket fire, they 
opened a steady fusilade. As Shelby afterward said, "The mountain was 
covered with flame and smoke and seemed to thunder." 
Colonel Cleveland swung around the clearing and brought his North 
Carolinians into position on the north side of the mountain, his riflemen 
posting themselves behind rocks and trees below the headquarters marquee 
of Major Ferguson. To Cleveland's left was Colonel Lacey and his 
contingent of Sumter's Brigade. 
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During the half hour of charging, countercharging, and skirmishing all 
of the American Colonels except one had moved into their assigned posi-
tions. Colonel William Campbell had moved up the wagon road on the 
southeast of the mountain. Colonel McDowell had found his position farther 
up the mountain. And Colonels Winston, Chronicle, and Hambright had 
moved into position east and north of the summit of Little King's Mountain. 
The Americans had achieved the dream of Indian warriors. They had 
completely encircled the enemy and were ready for a ring fight. With 
their long rifles they drove the Tories from behind the wagons. They 
knocked the mounted American Volunteers from their saddles. And they 
shot two horses from under Major Ferguson. 
The firing became faster and wilder. From their position on top of 
Little King's Mountain Ferguson's Loyalist riflemen were overshooting 
their targets. But the backwater men, shielding themselves behind trees 
and rocks, were firing with deadly accuracy and cutting down everything 
on King's Mountain. 
The North Carolina militia, having been in service only a week, poorly 
trained and indifferently armed, recoiled from the firing into their flanks. 
As they retreated into the center of the clearing near the eastern summit of 
King's Mountain, their numbers and their loss of discipline threw confusion 
into all of Ferguson's corps. Soon they had crowded the other militiamen 
as well as the Loyal American Volunteers into a space sixty yards long and 
forty yards wide. 
Seated on a third horse, Major Ferguson watched the growing con-
fusion, crowding, and terror. He realized that he would have to extricate 
his command from this bloody ring fight. He would have to get his men 
down again to level ground. He could then return to the use of the bayonet. 
From his horse Ferguson could see that near the summit the wagon 
road turned east and went down the side of Little King's Mountain. To 
the east of the mountain lay farms, with fields and clearings, level land 
on which he could maneuver, reform his troops and disperse his enemies. 
And the road was free of Americans. 
With a yell to the American Volunteers to follow him, Patrick Ferguson 
brandished his sword in his left hand and started to cut his way d~wn 
King's Mountain. Pandemonium broke out among the Loyalists. Discipline 
vanished. Whimpering country lads huddled so closely among the staunch 
troops that Captain DePeyster could not form the American Volunteers. 
Only four men followed Major Ferguson. Before they had advanced 
twenty yards, Cleveland's sharpshooters opened fire across the summit. 
Patrick Ferguson toppled from his saddle and sprawled on the ground, 
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leaving his left foot still in the stirrup. Eight rifle balls had struck him, two 
bursting through his body and one through his head. 
As soon as Captain Abraham DePeyster saw Ferguson toppled from 
his horse, he assumed command of the corps. Seeing his men surrounded 
and helpless, he raised a white flag. He immediately rode his gray horse 
into the American ranks looking for their commanding officer. 
"Where is your commander?" he shouted. The troops pointed toward 
Colonel Campbell. The colonel was wearing a white shirt, open at the 
collar, and a handkerchief tied around his head, and DePeyster hesitated 
momentarily. But Henry Dickson brought his gun down with a thump and 
said, "He is our commander." 
DePeyster rode up to Campbell, took his sword by the point, and 
handed it to the colonel. Campbell declined the proffered weapon. During 
their exchange some of the Whigs had continued firing into the Tories. 
DePeyster remonstrated that their action was "Damned unfair!" 
"Dismount!" replied Campbell. Then turning to his troops he shouted, 
"Cease firing! For God's sake, cease firing!" 
They ceased firing and the Battle of King's Mountain was over. The 
backwater men had killed Major Patrick Ferguson, defeated his corps, and 
captured all of the survivors. 
Even while under guard Lieutenant Allaire turned to his Diary. "The 
action continued an hour and five minutes," he wrote, "but their numbers 
enabled them to surround us." 
"The North Carolina regiment, seeing this, and numbers being out of 
ammunition, gave way, which naturally threw the rest of the militia into 
confusion," Allaire continued, and then gave an eloquent tribute to the 
Loyal American Volunteers. "Our poor little detachment, which consisted 
of only seventy men when we marched to the field of action, were all 
killed and wounded but twenty; and those brave fellows were soon 
crowded as close as possible by the militia. Captain DePeyster, on whom 
the command devolved, saw it impossible to form six men together, 
thought it necessary to surrender to save the lives of the brave men who 
were left." 
And then Lieutenant Anthony Allaire, Adjutant General of the Loyal 
American Volunteers, wrote a warm tribute to his fallen commander. "We 
lost in this action, Major Ferguson, of the Seventy-first regiment, a man 
well attached to his King and country, well informed in the art of war; 
he was brave and humane, and an agreeable companion; in short, he was 
universally esteemed in the army and I have reason to regret his unhappy 
fate." 
l 
COSTLY DELUSION: INLAND NAVIGATION IN 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA PIEDMONT 
DANIEL w. HOLLIS 
In 1817 the state of South Carolina launched a massive program of 
internal improvement. This prodigious effort, which by 1829 had involved 
the expenditure of $1,888,654.46, was the most ambitious program of 
domestic improvement undertaken by the state government prior to the 
twentieth century. South Carolina, with a white population of only 250,000 
and an annual state budget of a quarter of a million dollars, committed 
itself in 1818 to the expenditure of $1,000,000, and when it became evident 
in 1822 that this sum was insufficient, spent an additional $900,000 to 
complete the projects underway. 
Of the approximately $1,900,000 expended, about one sixth, or $314,206, 
was disbursed for roads, and $217,788 was applied to the improvement of 
navigation of rivers below the fall line. Some $1,264,005 was spent on the 
Piedmont rivers, and of this sum, all but $18,431 was devoted to the 
construction of eight big canals around the major obstructions of the 
Broad, Congaree, Saluda, and Wateree rivers.1 During the 1820's the state 
was appropriating $37,200 a year for the public schools and $15,000 or 
$20,000 for the South Carolina College. The state spent almost as much on 
internal improvements during the years 1817 to 1828 as it did on the public 
schools from the passage of the school act of 1811 to 1860 ( approximately 
$2,130,000). Yet the failure was as spectacular as the effort; of the eight 
canals, the six on the Saluda and Wateree rivers had been abandoned for 
navigation purposes by 1838, the state refused to assume any further 
financial responsibility for the Columbia Canal after 1840, and the Lockhart 
Canal on Broad River was abandoned in 1852. 
Prior to 1816 South Carolina had resorted to a number of devices to 
improve the navigation of its streams, but such efforts had been sporadic 
1 David Kohn, compiler and editor, Internal Improvement in South Carolina, 
1817-1828, Washington, 1938, p. 582. This monumental work consists of reproductions 
of the annual reports of the department of public works from 1818 to 1828 as well as 
other pertinent materials. 
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and ineffective. 2 Governor David R. Williams called in 1816 for "com-
mencing on a large scale, works of internal improvement."3 In 1817 Gov-
ernor Andrew Pickens suggested that the large surplus in the state treasury 
be applied to such a program.4 The legislators responded by creating the 
position of civil and military engineer at a salary of $4,000 a year and 
directing him to survey and report on "all rivers in the state," and to open 
as early as circumstances will permit, the Broad and Saluda rivers. The 
sum of $50,000 was appropriated to begin the work.5 
John Wilson, a graduate of the University of Edinburg and formerly a 
major in the United States Army, was engaged as civil and military en-
gineer. 6 In 1818 he reported that the navigation of up-country streams "is 
very much obstructed by rapids and falls, and is liable to the freshest of 
mountain torrents breaking through narrow and rockey [sic] passages, with 
all the extremes and inconveniences of too much or too little water."7 
Wilson suggested that the sum of $1,000,000 be devoted to an extensive 
program of internal improvement. 
The General Assembly, led by Representative Joel R. Poinsett, pledged 
the requested $1,000,000 and instructed the engineer to improve the navi-
2 For accounts of these efforts see Carl Epting, "Inland Navigation in South 
Carolina and Traffic on the Columbia Canal," Proceedings of the South Carolina 
Historical Association, 1936, pp. 18-23; Alfred G. Smith, Jr., Economic Read;ustment of 
an Old Cotton State: South Carolina, 1820-1860, Columbia, 1958, pp. 135-138; 
Statutes at Large of South Carolina, VII, passim. 
A private company, chartered in 1787, was empowered to improve the navigation 
of the Catawba-Wateree from the North Carolina line to Camden by means of canals, 
dams, and iocks. The charter of the Catawba and Wateree Navigation Company was 
quite similar to that of the Santee Canal Company, and John Rutledge, Thomas Sumter, 
Theodore Gaillard, Christian Senf, David Ramsay, and other prominent citizens 
were stockholders in both organizations. As of 1805 the company had invested 
$8,869.14 in the improvement of the Catawba-Wateree, but the stockholders were unable 
to raise sufficient capital, and the company's land acquisition policies aroused the 
hostility of inhabitants who resided near the river. In 1817 the State bought out the 
company for the sum of $19,258. See Statement of Sums Actually Expended ... by 
the Stockholders in the Catawba Company, 1805; Petition of Sundry Inhabitants of 
York, praying improvement of the Navigation of the Catawba River (n.d. ), MSS, 
Inland Navigation files, Catawba and Wateree rivers, South Carolina State Archives; 
Statutes, VI, 62; "Report of the Comptroller General," Acts and Resolutions of the 
General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, 1818, pp. 76-77; Henry Savage, 
River of the Carolinas: The Santee, New York, 1956, p. 250. 
3 Camden Gazette, November 26, 1816. 
4 Ibid., November 29, 1817. 
5 Acts and Resolutions of the General Assembly of South Carolina, 1817, p. 21. 
This publication contains the Acts of the General Assembly and certain resolutions, 
committee reports and administrative documents known as Reports and Resolutions. 
Titles and pagination vary. Hereafter the laws will be referred to as Acts and the 
resolutions and administrative documents as Reports and Resolutions. 
6 Kohn, p. 600. Not to be confused with John Lyde Wilson of Georgetown, a 
prominent legislator and governor from 1822 to 1824. 
7 Ibid., pp. A 7, A 22. 
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gation of the rivers, cut canals, build turnpike roads, etc. 8 This compre-
hensive scheme encompassed all of the streams in the state, but immediate 
attention was to be given the Broad and Saluda in order to concentrate as 
much business as possible at the new capital city of Columbia. 9 
In 1819 Wilson designed plans for several canals on the Broad, Con-
garee, and Catawba-Wateree rivers, and construction was begun on a 
canal at the mouth of the Saluda. David R. Williams was engaged in 
improving the Peedee, and a contractor named Mordecai Barbour, and 
several skilled workmen were brought from Petersburg, Virginia, to remove 
obstructions from the Wateree, Congaree, and Broad rivers. The work on 
the Wateree and Congaree was intended to open these streams for 
steamboats.10 
The projected works were so ambitious that it was felt that they were 
beyond the ability of one man to superintend. To remedy this situation the 
engineer was replaced in 1819 by a board of public works. The five 
commissioners, to be elected by the General Assembly, were given carte 
blanche to let contracts, engage engineers, hire laborers, purchase land, etc. 
Furthermore, the board was to be self-perpetuating, and some of the com-
missioners were to receive salaries as directors or superintendents. 11 The 
five-man board elected in December, 1819, consisted of Wilson, Poinsett, 
Williams, W. R. Davie, and Thomas Baker.12 
On January 24, 1820, the board held an organizational meeting at 
Davie's home on the Catawba River. Poinsett was elected president and 
Abram Blanding was chosen to replace David R. Williams, who had de-
clined to serve. Wilson was appointed commissioner of the department of 
roads, rivers, and canals at a salary of $4,500. Thomas Baker was made 
commissioner of the department of public buildings at a salary of $2,500, 
and two engineers were employed. 13 
The board soon underwent several changes in personnel. Ill health 
caused Wilson to decline his salaried position and he soon left the board, 
whereupon Blanding became commissioner of roads, rivers and canals in 
February, 1820.14 William R. Davie died in 1820, and Poinsett, who had 
8 Acts, 1818, pp. 12, 33. The sum of $1,000,000 was to be paid in four annual 
appropriations of $250,000, beginning in 1818. 
9 The concentration of the Broad and Saluda, later the subject of controversy, was 
the result of a resolution of the House of Representatives. Reports and Resolutions, 
1817, p. 100; ibid., 1818, p. 88; "Internal Improvements in South Carolina," North 
American Review, XIII (July, 1821 ), 147. 
lOSartre, "Merleau-Ponty," Situations, pp. 158-159. 
11 Acts, 1819, p. 34. 
12 Camden Gazette and Mercantile Advertiser, December 23, 1819. 
13 Ibid., February 3, 1820. The engineers, Thomas Sobieski and John Couty, were 
engaged at salaries of $2,500 and $1,500 respectively. 
14 Kohn, pp. 67, 71; R. H. Payne to Eldred Simkins, February 18, 1821, Letter 
Book, Superintendent of Public Works, MS, State Archives; hereafter referred to as 
Letter Book, S.P.W. The reference to John Lyde Wilson is evidently an error. See 
letters to Major John Wilson, June 6, 17, 1820. 
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been elected to Congress, resigned in June, 1821. Nicholas Herbemont 
became president of the board in November, 1821, at which time other 
members were Blanding, Robert G. Mills of Chester, and Robert Mills 
( later the distinguished architect). Senator William J. Myddelton of St. 
Matthew's Parish served as a fifth member in 1822.15 
By the fall of 1820 work was well underway on two canals on the 
Saluda, a canal on the Congaree at Columbia, and. one at Lockhart's 
shoals on the Broad River. Additional contracts had been let for canals at 
Landsford and Fishing Creek on the Catawba-Wateree and plans for a 
third, the Wateree Canal, were being drawn. 16 Poinsett, in presenting the 
board's report for 1820, stated that from progress made thus far, public 
works opening up an inland navigation of 1500 miles would be completed by 
the end of 1822 within the sum appropriated by the state. 17 In 1821 work 
was fully under way on the three canals on the Catawba-Wateree, one of 
the Saluda canals was completed, and construction continued on the Co-
lumbia and Lockhart canals.18 
The launching of such an ambitious, unproven program involving the 
largest expenditures the state government had yet made in peacetime 
inevitably aroused great interest. The scheme was highly political from the 
beginning; several commissioners and contractors were members or former 
members of the General Assembly. Criticism emerged from the commercial 
rivalry of Columbia, Camden, and Cheraw (Chatham) and from the 
towns on the Peedee and Wateree, which resented the initial concentration 
of effort on the Broad and Saluda.19 The Pee Dee Gazette ridiculed the 
Saluda as an obstacle-filled "creek." The fact that this river flowed into 
the Broad in the "magical vicinity of Columbia" made it a "convenient 
conductor of public money."20 As a general rule Peedee and Wateree 
spokesmen did not, at this time, question the feasibility of the inland 
navigation plan as long as their streams received a proper share of the 
funds. Nevertheless, some critics did maintain that the state should con-
centrate on roads rather than rivers, especially if the roads would benefit 
their particular localities. 21 
15 Kohn, pp. 23, 128, 170; W. H. Gibbes to Thomas Pinckney, June 19, 1821, MS, 
Letter Book, S. P. W., State Archives; Camden Gazette, June 21, December 27, 1821; 
Emily B. Reynolds and Joan R. Faunt, Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State 
of South Carolina, 1776-1964, Columbia, 1964, p. 281. Eldred Simkins and Thomas 
Pinckney were among those elected who declined to serve. 
16 Kohn, pp. 19-20, 39-46, 52-57; Camden Gazette, March 9, 1820. 
17 Kohn, p. 24. 
1s Ibid., pp. 122-125. 
10 Smith, pp. 138, 143. 
20 Pee Dee Gazette, quoted in Camden Gazette, August 16, 1821, July 3, 1822. 
21 Camden Gazette, zune 3, December 16, 1819; March 30, April 6, December 7, 
1820; Southern Chronic e and Camden Gazette, August 28, 1822; Camden Southern 
Chronicle, November 19, 1823. 
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Another problem involved labor. When the public works were begun 
in 1817-1818 the cotton boom was at its peak, and with prices at thirty 
cents a pound, slave labor, if available, was expensive. Furthermore, stone 
cutters and excavators were virtually non-existant, and brick masons and 
engineers were in short supply. The situation was made worse by the fact 
that other states were competing for the services of such personnel. Poin-
sett authorized agents in New York and Boston to engage skilled laborers 
at a permium of ten percent over local wage scales. Travel pay and other 
inducements were offered, and the agents were to receive ten dollars for 
each artisan who came to South Carolina. 22 
By the summer of 1820 some 1,000 northern artisans had been imported 
to work on the various projects.23 Working in or near the water during 
the hot Carolina summer proved hazardous to the health of these trans-
planted workmen, and after a number had died, operations were suspended 
on the rivers during the "sickly season" and the men transferred to roads. 
This was a humane policy, but it caused frustrating delays and increased 
the cost.24 The high wages aroused resentment, and the Pee Dee Gazette 
assailed the importation of expensive labor from "New or Old England" 
to work on elaborate canals on the Broad and Saluda while the Peedee 
went neglected. 2·5 
In 1822 it became obvious that, despite Poinsett's prediction, the public 
works could neither be completed on time nor within the designated 
$1,000,000. A torrent of criticism arose. For four years, said the Pee Dee 
Gazette, the people had been "lavishly fed with mighty schemes of public 
improvement." Demagogues had thrust their hands into the state treasury 
and $1,000,000 had been exhausted, but now an awakened people were 
asking "where are the rivers made navigable?"26 When the General As-
sembly met in November, two representatives introduced resolutions calling 
for an investigation, and John Belton O'Neall of Newberry moved to 
repeal the act establishing the board of public works.27 
22 Poinsett to Jonah Tenney of New York and to John L. Sullivan of Boston, 
January 28, 1820, MS, Letter Book, S.P.W., State Archives; Kohn, p. A 21. 
23 "Internal Improvements," p_p. 148-149; Camden Gazette, April 27, 1820. Irish 
laborers who came in 1820 to dig the Columbia Canal formed the nucleus of Co-
lumbia's first Roman Catholic Church. See J. J. O'Connell, Catholicity in the Caro-
linas and Georgia, New York, 1879, pp. 196-197. 
24 William H. Gibbes to Joel R. Poinsett, April 22, 1820; Gibbes to William Nixon, 
September 13, 1820, Letter Book, S.P.W., State Archives; Kohn, pp. 22, 126; Camden 
Gazette, September 28, 1820. 
25 Quoted in Camden Gazette, July 19, 1821; Charleston City Gazette, December 
10, 1820. 
26 Quoted in Southern Chronicle and Camden Gazette, July 3, 1822. For additional 
criticism see ibid., August 9, 1821; Charleston City Gazette, May 25, 1822. 
21 Charleston Mercury, December 7, 1822; Camden Southern Chronicle, Decembe1 
11, 1822. 
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In response, the legislative committee on internal improvements is-
sued a lengthy report that was remarkable for the candor of its criticism 
and for the fact that it recommended full-scale continuation of the grand 
design. The committee, acknowledging the "mortification and disappoint-
ment" that had accompanied the failure of the public works program, placed 
some of the blame upon the General Assembly for creating a board of such 
extensive powers and divided responsibility. Attention had been distracted 
and concentration dissipated; consequently, the big projects had been 
commenced and prosecuted behind schedule from year to year without 
"anything like an accurate estimate of the cost of any of the work." Other 
factors had been the "exhorbitant" cost of labor, the lack of experience of 
South Carolinians in such undertakings, and the fact that the system was 
so far-reaching that no benefits had been derived from those portions that 
had been completed. 2s 
The committee stated that although the sum of $1,009,451.52 had been 
expended, several hundred thousand dollars would be needed to complete 
the program, and it recommended that $200,000 be appropriated in 1822. 
If the works were abandoned in their present condition, the committee 
said, the great sums already invested would be lost, and South Carolina 
would be ridiculed for having begun such projects without the spirit or 
capacity to put them into operation. The committee suggested that the 
board be replaced by a superintendent in whom authority and direction 
could be concentrated. This official was to be elected by the General As-
sembly and could appoint an engineer to assist him. The report insisted 
that detailed and accurate estimates be made of all new projects, which 
must also receive legislative approval. It is interesting to note that the 
committee did not mention the fact that the state was borrowing money 
to finance internal improvements.29 
The legislature adopted the report, the sum of $200,000 was appro-
priated to continue the grand design, and Blanding was elected superinten-
dent at a salary of $3,000.30 Thus the public works department had 
reverted to the organization of 1818, but in the future all operations were 
to receive the careful attention of the committee on internal improvements. 
Surprisingly enough, serious opposition failed to develop.31 
In later years, William J. Grayson, William Gregg, James H. Hammond, 
John Belton O'Neall, and others were to deplore the "convulsion," "folly," 
2s Reports and Resolutions, 1822, pp. 95-100. 
29 Jbid. 
30 Acts, 1822, pp. 19, 47. 
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and "mania," that swept the state into the inland navigation plan.32 O'Neall, 
for example, stated that South Carolina "plunged wildly" into the scheme 
and began "that shameful waste of public money that gave contractors a 
premium on all they could expend." Grayson said that it would have been 
better to have abandoned the canals in 1822, because the subsequent 
expenditures were only thrown away. "Civis" might fume in the Charleston 
City Gazette about the large sums appropriated "to amuse our self-made 
engineer," but the only prominent critic in the State House at this time, 
aside from O'Neall, seems to have been Governor Thomas Bennett.33 
In light of the subsequent embarrassing failure of the inland naviga-
tion scheme, it is difficult to understand why it did not encounter greater 
legislative opposition, especially in view of the fact that as of 1822 the 
state government had borrowed $1,000,000 to continue the program.34 By 
1823 serious defects had been revealed in the Santee Canal; severe drought 
in 1817, 1818, and 1819 had dried up some of its sections, and it had 
frequently been forced to close.35 Furthermore, low water had at times 
caused steamboats to be stranded in Columbia and Augusta.36 
Grayson's explanation for the failure of the legislators to heed such 
warning signs was simple pork barrel politics. The plan, he said, "took 
like wildfire," with every district having its own pet project: "One scheme 
supported another. Mr. A voted for Mr. B's canal and B voted for A's road 
or swamp. Everybody got what he wanted. . . . Mr. Poinsett took fortune 
at the flood and floated into official station and the state gradually 
recovered its senses after enormous losses."37 In 1823 and 1824 the General 
Assembly appropriated sums of $188,790 and $86,255 to continue the work.38 
In 1824 several of the long-awaited canals were completed. The Co-
lumbia Canal opened on February 16, 1824, with ceremonies that included 
a parade.39 This canal, which ran for three miles from Young's Mill at the 
82 Robert D. Bass, ed., "The Autobiography of William J. Grayson," Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1933, pp. 237-238; Harvey T. Cook, 
The Life and Legacy of David R. Williams, New York, 1916, p. 164; James H. 
Hammond in the Charleston Mercury, October 21, 1847; John B. O'Neall, Bench and 
Bar of South Carolina, 2 vols., Charleston, 1859, II, 239. 
33 Charleston City Gazette, January 29, 1823; Bennett's message in Camden 
Gazette, December 6, 1821. Bennett warned in 1821 against the building of elaborate 
projects for which the state lacked the experience and capacity to execute. He sug-
gested that the board of public works should improve the rivers below the fall line and 
suspend "canal navigation until the propriety of this expensive mode of improvement 
shall be manifest." Little attention was paid to Bennett's sagacious advice. 
34 Smith, pp. 150-151. 
35 F. A. Porcher, The History of the Santee Canal, Charleston, 1903, p. 11; Camden 
Gazette, August 28, 1822; Camden Southern Chronicle, October 16, 30, 1822. 
36 Camden Gazette and Mercantile Advertizer, November 22, 1821. 
37 Grayson, "Autobiography," p. 238. 
38 Acts, 1823, p. 31; ibid., 1824, p. 13; Reports and Resolutions, 1824, pp. 100-101. 
39 Camden Southern Chronicle, February 24, 1824. 
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junction of the Broad and Saluda rivers down the east bank of the Congaree 
to a point near Rocky Creek, was an immediate success.40 
The next canals to be put into operation were those on the Saluda. The 
Saluda Canal at the river mouth, and the canal at Dreher's shoals, some 
twelve miles above Columbia, were actually completed in 1821, but could 
not be fully utilized until the completion of the dam in the Broad River 
which would enable boats from the Saluda to enter the Columbia Canal. 
In 1824 some $8,000 was expended in sluicing the Saluda from Dreher's 
Canal to the Abbeville line, and a navigation lock was constructed for the 
dam at Lorick's mill some thirty-five miles above Columbia.41 In March, 
1825, it was announced that the navigation of the Saluda had been opened 
to Abbeville and Laurens districts and that a boat with forty bales of cotton 
could descend from Cambridge in Abbeville district to Charleston.42 
The Broad River Canal at Lockhart was begun in 1820 and appears to 
have been virtually completed in 1823, but dissatisfaction with the work 
of the contractors and heavy damage fy freshets delayed its opening until 
January, 1826.43 
The four canals on the Catawba-Wateree were the most ambitious of 
the public works, and the fact that they were interdependent and that 
two of them were built in sections makes it more difficult to determine 
when they were completed and actually went into operation. In 1820 work 
on the Catawba, or Fishing Creek, Canal was begun, a contract was let 
for the canal at Landsford, and surveys were made for the Rocky Mount 
and Wateree canals.44 
All sections of the Wateree Canal went into operation in 1826.46 
Blanding's successor, Benjamin F. Whitner, reported in 1829 that the Rocky 
Mount Canal would soon be completed. The Landsford Canal had not 
yet yielded any tolls, he said, and "scarce any" tolls had been collected at 
the Catawba Canal, but both of these public works would be fully utilized 
upon the completion of the canal at Rocky Mount, which appears to have 
opened in January, 1830.4 6 
40 Epting, p . 26. Young's mill was at the site of the present bridge on Elmwood 
Avenue. The canal was soon transporting 30,000 bales of cotton a year, and it played 
an important part in the growth of Columbia. 
41 Kohn, pp. 304-305, 334-335, 347; Acts, 1823, p. 11. 
42 Charleston City Gazette, March 23, 1825. 
43 Kohn, pp. 45, 123, 164-165, 303, 346, 429, 517. 
44 Ibid., pp. 52-56, 63-66; Camden Gazette and Mercantile Advertiser, February 
3, March 30, April 20, 1820. 
45 Kohn, pp. 425-429. 
4G Report of the Superintendent of Public Works for 1829, Columbia, 1829, pp. 
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In 1827 the General Assembly's committee on internal improvements 
reported that the public works were almost completed: "The whole extent 
of canaling, on our upper rivers has been twenty-five miles; in which dis-
tance there are fifty-nine locks; of which, four are wooden, four brick, and 
fifty-one of granite."47 Blanding reported that the eight canals cost a total 
of $1,245,573, or roughly $50,000 a mile for twenty-five miles.48 
The committee announced that "a navigation of more than two thou-
sand miles" had been opened, with water transportation to "every district 
in the state, except Greenville."49 The Saluda was navigable for 140 miles 
above Columbia, the Broad for 110, and the Catawba-vVateree from Camden 
to the North Carolina line. These statements were taken from Blanding's 
annual reports, and were typical of the allegations that he, Poinsett, and 
Robert Mills had long been making. Blanding frequently asserted that 
two-thirds of the agricultural produce of the state was grown within five 
miles of a navigable stream.50 The navigation enthusiasts also maintained 
that the improvement of the Catawba would open boat traffic from 
Charleston to Morganton, North Carolina, a distance of 300 miles.51 Robert 
Mills, whose Atlas and Statistics were by-products of the public works pro-
gram, filled both publications with statements concerning the navigability 
of South Carolina rivers. The visionary Mills wrote of linking the Broad 
with the French Broad and the Savannah with the Little Tennessee by 
navigation canals "with comparative ease."52 
By 1827 such optimistic presumptions could no longer gain wide ac-
ceptance. Even as Blanding continued to refer to 140 miles of navigation on 
the Saluda a resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives to 
investigate the causes that retarded the successful navigation of that 
stream.53 It was obvious that a great gap existed between the euphoria of 
47 Reports and Resolutions, 1827, pp. 62-65. 
48 Kohn, p. 582. Blanding presented a detailed statement of the cost of each 
canal in his Report for 1828. See Kohn, pp. 574-586; Reports and Resolutions, 1827, 
pp. 62-65. The length and cost of the canals was as follows: OilJ the Wateree, the 
Landsford Canal, two miles long, cost $130,000; Catawba, or Fishing Creek Canal, 
three miles, $165,000; Rocky Mount, five miles, $202,000; and the Wateree, five 
miles, $190,000. Including the $20,000 for the granite locks for the Wateree Canal 
appropriated in 1830 and 1832, and a proportionate share of the administrative 
expenses, the fifteen miles of canals on the Wateree cost about $700,000, or about 
$46,000 per mile. The Columbia Canal, three miles in length, cost $206,000, and the 
Lockhart Canal, two and one-half miles long, $111,000. On the Saluda River the 
lock at Lorick's mill dam cost $2,000, the one-mile canal at Dreher's shoals $78,000, 
and the three-mile Saluda Canal $161,000. 
49 Reports and Resolutions, 1827, p. 64. 
50 Kohn, pp. 81-85, 230-231. See George L. Champion's comment on the margin 
of the pages. 
51 Ibid., pp. 76, 301. 
52 Robert Mills, Atlas of South Carolina ( 1938 ed.), Columbia, 1938; Statistics of 
South Carolina, Charleston, 1826, pp. 157-158, 728, 757. 
53 Kohn, p. 585; South Carolina State Gazette and Columbia Advertizer, December 
22, 1827. 
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the canal sponsors and the demonstrated benefits of these expensive works. 
Strong opposition developed before the legislature adopted the committee's 
report with its recommended appropriation of $97,000.54 
In 1828 the Camden Journal took the lead in shouting that the emperor 
wore no clothes. The internal improvements program, it asserted, was a 
collossal failure that had been predicated upon "dicta fulminated ex 
cathedra" and characterized by "blundering speculations, false calcula-
tions, delusive theories, and vain expenditures."55 After reviewing the 1827 
report of the internal improvements committee, the newspaper signaled 
out the comments pertaining to the navigability of the Saluda and other 
streams and asserted that "any deliberative assembly that would assent to 
such a report, flying so directly in the face of fact . . . must be indif-
ferent to the interests of its constituents, careless of its own character and 
evidently unaware of its own responsibility."56 
A full scale reaction set in. "Plain Man," writing in the Columbia 
State Gazette, demanded an end to the waste of public funds, and called 
attention to the fact that the state government had borrowed the sum of 
$1,550,000 in order to pursue its program of internal improvement. By add-
ing the interest fees he charged that the public works would cost $3,540,-
000. 57 "Plain Truth," in reply questioned these figures, but the realization 
that the state had borrowed money to finance the canals only increased the 
criticism.58 
The General Assembly that convened in November, 1828, was in an 
economy mood. The drop in the price of cotton to eight or ten cents had 
brought severe depression to South Carolina, and a strong political faction 
led by Comptroller General Alexander Speer insisted on reducing expen-
ditures. 59 The legislature voted funds for existing contracts, but this appro-
priation brought to an end large financial outlays for the great program 
launched in l 817. 
54 Acts, 1827, p. 12; Reports and Resolutions, 1827, p, 63; Camden Journal, De-
cember 15, 1827. 
55 Camden Journal, March 15, 1828. 
56 Ibid., September 6, 1828. 
57 Quoted in ibid. 
58 South Carolina State Gazette and Columbia Advertizer, August 23, 30, 1828. 
Perhaps it would be unfair to add the interest charges, but if only a portion of the 
interest the state paid on the $1,500,000 it borrowed is added to the cost, the amount 
spent on internal improvements would be greater than the approximately $2,130,000 
appropriated for the public schools to 1860. See the annual school appropriations of 
$37,500 from 1811 to 1851, and of $75,000 (approximately) from 1852 to 1860 in the 
Acts. 
59 William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, the Nullification Controversy in 
South Carolina, 1816-1836, New York and London, 1965, p. 121; "Report of the 
Comptroller General," Reports and Resolutions, 1828, p . 5. 
COSTLY DELUSION: INLAND NAVIGATION IN THE S. C. PIEDMONT 39 
In 1828 the superintendent's salary was slashed to $2,200 and the 
position of assistant was abolished. 60 Blanding declined to offer for 
reelection, and thus departed the central figure in South Carolina's program 
of internal improvement. Forced to serve as his own secretary, treasurer, 
and bookkeeper, Blanding was praised by legislative committees as an 
"indefatigable servant," and apparently could have continued as superin-
tendent had he not chosen to return to the practice of law.61 He was suc-
ceeded by Representative Benjamin F. Whitner of Edgefield.62 
In 1829 Governor Stephen D. Miller stated that "a full equivalent will 
soon be realized for the immense sums lavished" upon the South Carolina 
rivers.63 But the Saluda, the first stream to receive the attention of the 
canal enthusiasts, soon revealed the great deficiencies in the system. Al-
though records of traffic and tolls are incomplete, it can be ascertained that 
trade on the Dreher Canal amounted to 708 bales of cotton in 1826, but 
only 41 in 1828. Tolls, which were set in 1828 at the rate of one cent per 
bale per canal lock, amounted to $32.21 in 1827 and $7.54 in 1828. Ap-
parently the canal was closed from 1831 to 1833, and tolls for 1834 were 
only $6.77. The Saluda Canal transported 712 bales in 1826 and 108 in 
1828. It collected $125.17 in tolls in 1826 and $113.75 in 1832, but the canal 
yielded no income in 1834. Lock keepers' salaries of $200.00 a year and 
cost of maintenance far exceeded income for both canals. 64 
Superintendent Whitner reported in 1829 that both canals on the 
Saluda had serious defects necessitating expensive repairs.65 A legislative 
committee, in response to a petition to erect a saw mill at Lorick's mill 
dam, stated in 1832 that the navigation lock there was "entirely unused," 
and that "the river is not used for purposes of navigation, nor is it likely 
to be so used until further improvements are made in the stream below 
60 Camden Journal, January 3, 1829. 
01 Kohn, pp. 349, 599; O'Neall, II, 239; Edwin J. Scott, Random Recollections of a 
Long Life, Columbia, 1884, p. 69; Reports and Resolutions, 1827, p. 65. A native of 
New England, this self-made engineer was a graduate of Brown University. Blanding 
practiced law in Camden and served in the General Assembly before moving to 
Columbia in 1819. For nine arduous years, first as commissioner and then as super-
intendent of public works, the Yankee lawyer somehow managed to retain the 
personal esteem of even his critics. The versatile Blanding was later a bank president, 
officer in a railroad company, builder of the Columbia water works, and editor of a 
law journal. 
62 South Carolina State Gazette and Columbia Advertizer, December 27, 1828. 
63 Camden Journal, November 28, 1829. 
64 Kohn, p. 517; Report of the S.P.W., 1829, p. 22; Exhibit of receipts and ex-
penditures on canals, 1831-1834, MS, Inland Navigation files, State Archives. This 
report lists the receipts and expenditures for each canal, but does not give the volume 
of traffic. 
65 Report of the S.P.W., 1829, p. 11. 
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these mills."611 Since no improvements were made, it is safe to assume that 
the Dreher and Saluda Canals had been abandoned by 1837. 
All four canals on the Catawba presumably went into full-scale op-
eration with the much anticipated opening of the Rocky Mount Canal in 
1830. Information about these watercourses is sketchy, but it is obvious 
that the great trade Mills had predicted would descend from Morganton 
failed to develop and that these canals soon needed extensive repairs.67 
This writer has found no record of tolls, if any, collected by the 
Landsford Canal. Income at the Catawba, or Fishing Creek, Canal 
amounted to $43.99 in 1831 and $51.10 in 1833, but declined to $16.71 in 
1834. Tolls in .1837 were $19.26, and this appears to have been the last 
year it was in operation. Tolls at Rocky Mount reached a peak of $312.69 
in 1831 but dropped to $65.12 in 1833, and there appears to be no record of 
tolls after that year. The most successful canal on this stream was the 
Wateree, which transmitted 2,943 bales of cotton in 1827 and yielded an 
income of $276.41 in 1831 and $154.23 in 1834, but expenditures for the 
period 1831 to 1834 exceeded income by $3,210.19.6 ~ 
As of 1836 the canals on the Catawba-\Vateree were in poor condition, 
but no appropriations to repair them were forthcoming then or later.69 
Apparently navigation on these four watercourses had ceased by 1838.70 
"Among the numerous failures in our system of internal improve-
ments," wrote the editor of the Columbia Southern Times in 1830, 
"it is gratifying to meet with one success."71 From 21,863 bales of cotton 
66 Reports and Resolutions, 1832, p. 27. Exit from the Saluda Canal was dependent 
upon the dam in the Broad River at the head of the Columbia Canal. This dam was 
out of operation after June, 1836. In 1843 a legislative petitioner stated that the 
Saluda Canal had been "long abandoned." See petition of Sara Starke to remove a 
dam in Broad River, 1843, MS, Inland Navigation files, Broad River, State Archives. 
67 Report of the S.P.W., 1829, pp. 12-13; Camulen Journal, November 6, 1830; 
Reports and Resolutions, 1831, p. 28; Acts, 1830, p. 13; ibid., 1832, p. 14. In 1831 the 
internal improvements committee reported that the utility of the twenty-nine granite 
locks on the upper part of the river was jeopardized by the poor condition of two 
wooden locks in the Wateree Canal, which were replaced by granite locks at a cost 
of $20,000. 
68 Kohn, p. 517; Report of the S.P.W., 1829, p. 22; Exhibit of receipts and ex-
penditures on canals, 1831-1834, MS, Inland Navigation files, State Archives; Fishing 
Creek Canal Record Book, MS, Xerox Copy at South Caroliniana Library. Original 
in possession of Charles Hicklin, Richburg, S. C. 
6» Reports and Resolutions, 1836, p. 113. 
70 See MS petitions pertaining to the canals and to navigation of the Catawba-
Wateree in Inland Navigation files, State Archives. One petitioner stated in 1846 
that the "long since abandoned" Fishing Creek Canal was filling up with silt and that 
the stagnant water was a danger to health. See petition of Dr. William Cloud, 1846. 
See also, Journal of the House of Representatives af the State of South Carolina, 1842, 
p. 126; ibid., 1843, pp. 64, 126; ibid., 1844, pp. 29, 154; Journal of the Senate of the 
State of South Carolina, 1845, p. 154. 
71 F ebruary 8, 1830. 
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in 1825, traffic on the Columbia Canal increased to 48,874 bales in 1829, 
and to a peak of 66,597 in 1833. During the years 1831 to 1834 it had an 
income of $13,523, which exceeded upkeep by $8,277.72 
Nevertheless, even this successful watercourse developed problems. 
The dam in the mouth of Broad River at the head of the canal was poorly 
constructed and by 1830 was deteriorating. It failed to keep a sufficient 
supply of water in the canal, which caused it to be closed in periods of dry 
weather. In 1830 a group of Columbia merchants complained that the dam 
went neglected while tolls from the Columbia Canal were used to repair 
those that had no income.73 In 1831 the House of Representatives agreed 
to an appropriation of $25,000 to renovate the Columbia Canal and extend 
it two miles up Broad River to Bull Sluice, but the Senate refused to 
concur, beginning a contest that continued for five years. 74 Finally, in 
1836 the legislature appropriated the sum of $40,000 to repair and extend the 
canal.7 5 
Work on the extension was begun in 1837 and the canal was reopened 
in January, 1840.76 As of May 6 it had transmitted 5,393 bales of cotton 
when the biggest freshet on the Broad River since 1796 inflicted so much 
damage that it was put out of business.7 7 The General Assembly was 
greeted in November by a veritable flood of petitions to restore the canal 
and to improve Broad River navigation, but the legislators rejected all 
such requests and instead appropriated $1,000 to sluice the rapids "from 
Bull Sluice to Granby."78 Thus the General Assembly had written off a 
public work costing $246,000. In 1843 the State leased the portion of the 
canal from Bull Sluice to Gervais Street to Frederick W. Green, who was 
interested in developing the canal's water power. The section south of 
Gervais street was abandoned. 
The state government would hardly have abandoned a canal of such 
proven value had it not been for the coming of railroads. The line from 
72 Epting, p. 26; Exhibit of receipts and expenditures on canals, 1831-1834, MS, 
Inland Navigation files, State Archives. Epting s reference to the year "1883" is a 
typographical error repeated by Smith, p. 155. 
73 Columbia Southern Times and State Gazette, August 16, September 30, 1830. 
74 Reports and Resolutions, 1831, pp. 28, 51. In 1833 the Senate blocked the 
Columbia Canal appropriation by postponing consideration until "the first day of 
January." The General Assembly invariably adjourned before December 25. See also, 
ibid., 1833, pp. 14, 54; ibid., 1834, pp. 37, 84-85. 
75 Acts, 1836, p. 21; Reports and Resolutions, 1836, pp. 112-114. 
76 See copy of contract between George Walker, superintendent of public works, 
and Charles McColloch, March 23, 1837, MS, Inland Navigation files, Columbia Canal, 
State Archives; Columbia Canal Lock Book, MS, State Archives. 
77 Columbia Carolina Planter, June 3, 1840; Reports and Resolutions, 1842, p. 68. 
78 Acts, 1840, p. 100; Reports and Resolutions, 1840, p. 64. See numerous MSS 
and printed petitions and memorials concerning Columbia Canal and Broad River in 
Inland Navigation files, State Archives. 
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Charleston to Hamburg, completed in 1833, had quickly demonstrated its 
superiority to river transportation, and a branch of this railroad was being 
built to Columbia. 
Some traffic on the Lockhart Canal continued until 1849. From 1826 
to 1828 it transported about 2,000 bales of cotton a year. Tolls amounted 
to $331.20 in 1827 and to $440.96 in 1834, which appears to have been its 
best year. There is no record for tolls in 1832, however, and income for the 
four-year period 1831-1835 was only $708.88 while expenses amounted to 
$1,722.70. Tolls in the late 1830's and the 1840's amounted to about $150.00 
a year, which was almost enough to pay the lock keeper, but it was quite 
insufficient for maintenance.79 A special commissioner reported in 1853 that 
the Lockhart Canal's water power was worth far more than the expense of 
keeping it navigable. 80 
As the inefficacy of the canals became increasingly apparent in the 
1830's, Governors Robert Y. Hayne and George McDuffie suggested that 
they be leased or sold, but the Columbia Canal was the only one that could 
attract a lessee.81 Former Governor James H. Hammond asserted in 1847 
that these "monuments to uselessness" on the Saluda and Catawba could 
not be given away and that the only momento left of the internal improve-
ment program was a petty office over which there was an annual squabble 
in the General Assembly. 82 
Resolutions to abolish the office of superintendent had been introduced 
in the legislature since 1829, and in 1848 he was replaced by a commissioner, 
appointed by the governor at a salary of $200.00. He was directed to take 
charge of the Lockhart Canal and the Saluda Turnpike, the only two 
public works deemed worthy of attention.83 James Gibbs served in this 
79 Report of the S.P.W., 1829, p. 22; Kohn, p. 517; Exhibit of receipts and 
expenditures on canals, 1831-1834; Reports and Resolutions, 1837, p. 2; ibid., 1838, p. 
118; ibid., 1843, p. 110; ibid., 1845, pp. 67, 211; ibid., 1846, p. 73; ibid., 1847, p. 43; 
Acts, 1838, p. 12. 
so Reports and Resolutions, 1853, pp. 136-138. 
s1 Ibid., 1833, p. 9; ibid., 1835, p. 24. 
82 "Anti-debt" (James H. Hammond) in the Charleston Mercury, October 21, 
November 15, 26, 1847. B. F. Whitner served as superintendent of public works until 
February, 1834, although the salary was cut to $1,500.00 in 1830 and to $1,200.00 in 
1831. See Acts, 1830, p. 12; ibid., 1831, p. 11; Columbia Canal Book, State Archives. 
Whitner's successor, Representative Thomas H. Nixon of Edgefield, was replaced in 
1836 by Senator George Walker of St. Bartholomew's Parish, who served for only one 
year before giving way to Re_presentative Robert G. Mills of Chester, a former member 
of the board of public works. See Reports and Resolutions, 1836, p. 77; Camden 
Commercial Journal, December 23, 1837. By 1840 the post had become a political 
plum, but those who won the prize survived for only a year or two before losing to 
another aspirant, usually a legislator. In 1842 there were thirteen candidates. See 
House Journal, 1842, p. 155. 
83 Reports and Resolutions, 1849, p. 16. 
84 House Journal, 1852, p. 245. 
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capacity until 1851, but in 1852 the General Assembly directed that a 
special officer be appointed to recommend steps to dispose of the public 
works. 84 This official, Representative E. C. Leitner of Spartanburg, re-
ported that the canals on the Saluda and Wateree rivers were "entirely 
valueless" for purposes of navigation, and with the "slight exception" of the 
Lockhart Canal, the expenditure of millions would not make any of the 
canals navigable. 85 Leitner stressed the possibilities of water power, and 
recommended the sale of the canals to those who could utilize this feature. 
Such development was not to come for about forty years, however, and 
after 1853 the canals virtually disappeared from the pages of the legislative 
proceedings. 
Meanwhile, North Carolina's efforts, on a much smaller scale, to de-
velop the navigation of the Broad and Catawba rivers had proved equally 
frustrating. In 1820 the North Carolina Board of Public Improvements 
authorized the expenditure of $5,000 to improve the navigation of the 
Broad, but the work was suspended in 1823. In 1833 the Board declared 
that the $2,548.00 spent on the Broad "may be considered at present a 
total loss." The efforts of a Catawba River Navigation Company, which 
received the sum of $2,400 from the state, were almost completely ineffec-
tive, and in 1833 the Board of Public Improvements included the funds 
expended upon the Catawba with those spent on the Broad and other 
streams as being in the category of a "total loss."86 
If the advantage of hindsight tempts the historian to pass harsh judg-
ments upon the euphoria of the proponents of inland navigation in the 
Carolina up country, it should be remembered that the legislatures that 
sustained this program contained a group of men as able as any in state 
history. The coming of railroads undoubtedly hastened the demise of the 
canals, although those on the Saluda and Catawba were abandoned fifteen 
or twenty years before railroads penetrated the areas they were built 
to serve. The shallow, swift, shoal-infested rivers of the Piedmont refused 
to succumb to the grand design of Blanding, Mills, and Poinsett, but the 
granite locks of the Landsford, Lockhart, Saluda, and Wateree canals 
remain as momentoes of the splendid failure of an earlier day. 
85 Reports and Resolutions, 1853, pp. 136-138. 
86 Report of the Board of Internal Improvements of North Carolina, Raleigh, 1820-
1833, passim. See especially 1833, p. 6; Charles C. Weaver, Internal Improvements in 
North Carolina Previous to 1860, Baltimore, 1903, p. 65. 
DID JACKSON DISOBEY ORDERS 
HEWITI D. ADAMS 
"Remember that Greece had her Alexander," thundered Henry Clay 
on the floor of the House of Representatives, "Rome her Caesar, England 
her Cromwell, France her Bonaparte, and, that if we would escape the 
rock on which they split, we must avoid their errors." The object of Clay's 
discourse was America's most popular hero, Andrew Jackson, and the 
occasion was congressional debate on the propriety of Jackson's conduct 
of the Seminole campaign. 
Did Jackson indeed disobey in 1818 his orders and trample down "law, 
justice, the constitution, and the rights of other people"2 as Clay charged? 
The question was to have future political implications of a serious nature, 
both in influencing Clay's actions in 1825 and in acting as the proximate 
cause of the split between Jackson and John C. Calhoun in 1831. Calhoun, 
as Secretary of War, wrote the orders under which Jackson acted. While 
there can be little doubt about the intentions of the administration, the 
orders reflect the failure of Calhoun to express clearly those intentions. 
In that failure, there is little reason to condemn the Secretary of War. 
The office was vacant from March 4, 1817, until Calhoun accepted the post 
on December 10 in order to demonstrate his executive ability.3 The De-
partment of War at the time was in utter chaos. Charles M. Wiltse re-
marked that "only a man as young, as confident and as inexperienced as 
Calhoun was in the fall of 1817, would have risked his reputation at the 
head of the War Department at such a time."4 The new Secretary, himself, 
confessed his "want of experience"5 after he entered into his duties. 
The inexperienced Secretary of War was immediately confronted with 
a serious situation on the Florida border. There had been increasingly 
serious incidents involving Indians and runaway slaves who used Spanish 
territory as bases for raids into Georgia. Reports of these incidents led 
Calhoun, on December 16, 1817, to issue orders to Brigadier General 
Edmund P. Gaines, commanding Fort Scott in the Division of the South. 
Gaines was told that if the Seminole Indians refused to make reparation for 
their outrages on citizens of the United States, "it is the wish of the 
President that you consider yourself at liberty to march across the Florida 
1 U. S. Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., II, 636-660. 
2 James F. Hopkins (ed), The Papers of Henry Clay, Lexington, 1961, II, 659. 
3 Gerald M. Capers, John C. Calhoun, Opportunist, Gainesville, 1960, p. 62. 
4 Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Nationalist, Indianapolis, 1944, p. 149. 
5 W. Edwin Hemphill (ed), The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Columbia, 1963, II, 
22. See the letter to Major General Jacob Brown, December 17, 1817. 
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line and to attack them within its limits, should it be found necessary, 
unless they should shelter themselves under a Spanish post. In the last 
event, you will immediately notify this department."6 
At the time he issued these orders, Calhoun was not aware of further 
developments along the Georgia frontier. Large bands of Indians and 
Negroes were massing with obvious hostile intent. On November 21, 1817, 
the Army attacked one such concentration at Foweltown, in United States 
territory, and dispersed it. On November 30, 1817, a large party of hostiles 
ambushed a supply boat ascending the Appalachicola River, in Spanish 
territory. Of the forty men and seven women, wives of soldiers on the 
boat, only six men escaped. Gaines' reports of these incidents reached 
Washington on December 26, 1817, and prompted an immediate response 
by the Secretary. 
Calhoun informed Gaines that General Jackson, commander of the 
Division of the South, was being ordered to Fort Scott to take command of 
forces there. If Gaines thought his own force sufficient, he should penetrate 
through Florida from Amelia Island (where he had been sent to dispossess 
a band of adventurers) and "cooperate in the attack on the Seminoles."7 A 
copy of these orders to Gaines was sent to Andrew Jackson, as had been 
a copy of the orders to Gaines of December 16, 1817. 
Jackson received the copy of the December 16 orders "a few days" 
before January 6, 1818.8 On that date he wrote a "confidential" letter to 
President Monroe protesting the imposed restriction on entering Spanish 
forts. He further remarked that "the arms of the United States must be 
carried to any point within the limits of East Florida where an enemy is 
permitted and protected or disgrace attends." In this same letter Jackson 
also proposed that the whole of East Florida be seized and held as an 
indemnity for the outrages of Spain. He said that "this can be done without 
implicating the Government; let it be signified to me through any channel, 
( say Mr. J[ ohn] Rhea) that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable 
to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished."9 
When this letter was written, Jackson had not yet received the Decem-
ber 26 War Department orders to himself or to Gaines. The orders to 
Jackson directed him to proceed to Fort Scott with as: little delay as 
practicable and to take command of the forces in that section of the 
Southern Division. After an account of the Indian strength and instructions 
6 Annals, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., II, Appendix, 2158. 
7 Ibid. 
s John Spencer Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, Washington, 
1927, II, 345-346. 
9 Ibid. 
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to call on the militia as needed, the orders referred to Gaines' Amelia 
Island expedition and the December 26 orders to Gaines. 
The instructions to Jackson concluded with broad powers: 
With this view, you may be prepared to concentrate your forces, and 
to adopt the necessary measures to terminate a conflict which it has been 
the desire of the President, from considerations of humanity, to avoid, but 
which is now made necessary by their settled hostilities. lo ( my italics) 
Jackson wrote to Calhoun on January 12, 1818, acknowledging receipts 
of the orders and outlining his plans to bring an effective force into the 
field.11 On January 24, in a letter to Monroe, the General expressed his 
"full approbation of that order."12 This full approbation was in marked 
contrast to Jackson's earlier protest to Monroe about the restrictions on 
pursuing the savages into a Spanish post. In both his private correspondence 
and in his reports to the War Department, Jackson made it clear that he 
conceived his mission to be the restoration of peace and security ( tranquil-
ity) to the Southern frontier. 13 His actions showed that he conceived no 
restrictions on his use of force to achieve that end. 
Jackson's first act was to insure sufficient military strength to carry 
out his mission. Not reposing confidence in the militia, he called for 1,000 
Tennessee volunteers. This call was reported to both Calhoun and Monroe 
in the letters cited above; and Calhoun, on January 29, 1818, approbated 
the "measures . . . taken to bring an efficient force into the field."14 With 
this force insured, Jackson arrived at Fort Scott on March 9, 1818; and, 
having solved his supply problems, commenced his campaign on March 26, 
1818. 
The campaign, though vigorously pursued, was in many ways dis-
appointing. No great concentrations of enemy were encountered. The 
Englishman, Robert C. Ambrister, and the Scot, Alexander Arbuthnot, were 
captured, tried on charges of inciting the Indians, convicted and executed. 
Chief Hornattlemied and the prophet Hillis Hajo were captured by 
Captain McKeever, of the Navy, and hanged. The Spanish fort at St. 
Marks was captured when it became apparent that the commandant was 
actively assisting the Indians. 
These developments in the campaign were duly reported in a series 
of letters from Jackson to Calhoun. On April 20, 1818, the General wrote 
of his intention to return to Fort Gadsden, thence to proceed to his 
Headquarters at Nashville, Tennessee. On May 5, from Fort Gadsden, 
10 Annal-S, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., II, Appendix, 2159. 
11 Ibid., p . 2278. 
12 Bassett, II, 349. 
13 See Ibid., pp. 364-368, for examples. 
14 Annals, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., II, Appendix, 2177. 
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Jackson reported information "from the most unquestionable authority" that 
the Indians were being supplied and encouraged by the Governor of 
Pensacola." Further, it was reported that a party of four to five hundred 
Indians was gathered at that place. This information impelled Jackson 
to move to the west of the Appalachicola River and, if the reports proved 
correct, to occupy Pensacola. 15 On May 4, Jackson wrote to a friend that, 
if this were done, "I think I may safely say in the language of the late 
order from the Department of War that peace and safety is given to the 
southern frontier."16 
The date and reasons for Jackson's decision to proceed to Pensacola 
are clear. Only if large concentrations of Indians were scattered and their 
sources of supply eliminated could the General consider his mission to be 
accomplished. The Indians might reconcentrate, but without supplies their 
threat to peace and safety was minimal. It did not take the May 22 
challenge of the Spanish Commandant that "if you will proceed contrary 
to my expectations I will repulse you force to force"17 to bring Jackson 
to Pensacola. 
Nor was the Spanish force sufficient to deny Jackson possession of 
Pensacola on May 24 and, after some exchange of fire, of Fort Carlos de 
Barancas on May 28. In his proclamation on taking possession, Jackson 
announced that he was not extending the territorial limits of the United 
States or manifesting any unfriendly feeling for the Spanish Government. 
Rather, the reason for the action was self-defense which compelled the 
American Government to take possession of such parts of the Floridas in 
which the Spanish authority could not be maintained and to hold them 
"until Spain can furnish military strength sufficient to enforce existing 
treaties."18 
The legal foundation for the proclamation rested on the Pinckney 
Treaty of October 27, 1795. By the terms of that treaty, the high con-
tracting parties had each agreed by all means in their power to "maintain 
peace and harmony among the several Indian nations who inhabit the 
country adjacent to ... the boundaries .... "19 The inability or the unwill-
ingness to Spain to carry out these treaty provisions had given a sanctuary 
for marauding Indians that could no longer be tolerated. 
Jackson so argued in his report to the Secretary of War on June 2, 
15 Ibid., pp. 2189-2193. 
16 Bassett, II, 364-365. 
11 Ibid., p. 371. 
1s Ibid., pp. 374-375. 
19 Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History, New York, 1962, I, 
169. 
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1818, which marked the close of the campaign. 20 He further urged that 
the American Government hold the places occupied "until such time as 
Spain can guarantee, by an adequate military force, the maintaining her 
authority within the colony."21 He repeated the same sentiments in a 
" (private)" letter to President Monroe on the same date. He spoke of the 
hardships of the troops and added that "these are the men . . . that will 
aid in possessing the government of Ft. St. Augustine and Cuba, when 
thought necessary to be possessed by the American republick [sic]."22 
The Seminole Campaign ended without possession by the American 
Government of all the Floridas. That fact alone was probably the best 
evidence that President Monroe had not signified to Jackson "through any 
channel" a desire for possession of the Floridas by the United States; in 
other words, there was no "Johnny Rhea Letter." The fighting ceased in 
Florida, but in Washington it was just beginning. 
News of the capture of Pensacola, in particular, created a domestic 
and diplomatic sensation. John Quincy Adams confided to his Diary on 
July 21 the dilemma of the Administration. "If they avow and approve 
Jackson's conduct, they incur the double responsibility of having commenced 
a war against Spain, and of warring in violation of the Constitution without 
the authority of Congress. If they disavow him, they must give offense to 
all his friends, encounter the shock of his popularity, and have the ap-
pearance of truckling to Spain."23 
This dilemma found all the Cabinet except Adams arrayed against 
Jackson. Calhoun, in particular, was apprehensive of his reputation and 
apparently was convinced that Jackson had deliberately transcended his 
powers and instructions. 24 Adams, on the other hand, "thought that the 
whole conduct of General Jackson was justifiable under his orders, although 
he certainly had none to take any Spanish fort." Adams' principle was "that 
everything he [Jackson] did was defensive; that as such it was neither war 
against Spain nor violation of the Constitution."25 
Who was correct, Calhoun or Adams? The intentions of the Adminis-
tration were reported by President Monroe to the Congress in a message 
on March 25, 1818. He said that "orders have been given to the general 
in command not to enter Florida unless it be in pursuit of the enemy, and 
20 Annals, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., II, Appendix, 2207-2210. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Bassett, II, 376-378. 
23 Allan Nevins (ed.), The Diary af John Quincy Adams, New York, 1929, p. 200. 
24 Niles' Weekly Register, XL, 21, published Calhoun's letter of May 28, 1830, to 
Jackson on the subject. 
25 Nevins, p. 200. 
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in that case to respect the Spanish authority wherever it is maintained ... "26 
Although these words were ambiguous, it would seem that Monroe did not 
conceive any direct challenge by Jackson to Spanish authority. 
In a private letter to Jackson on July 19, 1818, Monroe also made clear 
his conviction that Jackson had exceeded his orders. The President asserted 
that "In calling you into active service against the Seminoles, and in com-
municating to you the orders, which had been given just before to Gen. 
Gaines, the views and intentions of the government, were fully disclosed 
in respect to the operations in Florida."27 Here, then, was the central 
question. Had Calhoun's orders to Jackson on December 26, 1817, clearly 
disclosed the intentions of the government? 
The orders to Gaines on December 16, 1817, referred to by Monroe, had 
indeed contained authority to march across the Florida line and to attack 
the savages in Spanish territory if it were necessary. The important re-
striction was on attacks if the savages should shelter themselves under a 
Spanish post. The intentions of the government at the time the orders were 
written had been made known to Gaines and to Jackson, who received a 
copy. The orders to Jackson on December 26, 1817, written in response to 
changed circumstances, represented a significant departure from those 
of December 16. Jackson was enjoined to adopt the necessary measures to 
terminate a conflict. No reference was made to the restriction in the earlier 
orders. It is a military axiom that if two orders are received which contain 
conflicting instructions, the instructions in the orders of more recent date 
apply. It is evident that Jackson so viewed the case for, while he protested 
the restriction in the orders of December 16, the orders of December 26 
met with his "full approbation." 
It is no fault of Jackson that his interpretation differed from that of 
the Administration. Given the inexperience of Calhoun, the sixteen days he 
had been in office, the conditions which existed in the War Department, and 
the press of writing orders in response to information received that same 
date, Calhoun's failure to refer to the earlier restrictions was understand-
able. Calhoun also was preoccupied, on December 26, with the expenses 
of taking permanent residence in Washington and a poor cotton crop. 28 
The ambitious young man needed vindication, as did the President. 
Monroe, after an exchange of correspondence with Jackson on the 
subject, suggested on October 20, 1818, that the General write a letter to 
the Department of War stating his view of his powers. "This will be 
26 James D. Richardson (ed.), Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Washington, 
1896, II, 32. 
21 Bassett, II, 382. 
28 See Calhoun's letter to John E. Calhoun, December 26, 1817, in the Calhoun 
papers at Clemson University. 
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answered, so as to explain ours, in a friendly manner by Mr. Calhoun, who 
has very just and liberal sentiments on the subject . . . Thus we shall all 
stand on the ground of honor . . . ."29 Jackson refused to be placed on the 
defensive, to be the sacrificial lamb. He replied on November 15 that 
"were I now to receive an official letter from the Secretary of War, explana-
tory of the light in which it was intended by the government that my 
orders should be viewed, I would with pleasure give my understanding of 
them."3 0 No such letter was forthcoming from the Secretary of War, and 
there the matter rested for twelve years. 
When, in the 1830-1831 controversy with Calhoun, Jackson injected a 
"Johnny Rhea letter," he obscured the real issue. Neither Rhea nor Monroe 
could recall such a letter. It probably never existed.3 1 Nor should the 
"Rhea letter" controversy obscure the fact that Jackson, in the Seminole 
Campaign, obeyed his orders as they were written and as any prudent man 
would have interpreted them. 
29 Bassett, II, 398. 
30 Ibid., p. 399. 
31 See R. R. Stenberg, "Jackson's 'Rhea Letter' Hoax," The Journal of Southern 
History, II, 1936, pp. 480-496, and James Schouler, "The Jackson and Van Buren 
Papers," The Atlantic Monthly, XVC, 1905, pp. 217-225. 
CLIO AND THE COLUMNISTS 0 
D. H. GILPATRICK 
When our good friend Winston Babb asked me a year ago to make 
this talk I consented because of many years of happy associations, especially 
since 1960 and I have been especially glad I did since January 21, 1968. I 
have not, however, changed the tone. I'm sure that Winston would not 
have wanted me to. The paper has been written intermittently over the 
past year, but I concluded that my standards must have been exclusively 
quantitative since it was discovered that the manuscript contained some-
thing over 10,000 words not counting 12.3 footnotes. Reading it aloud 
required an hour and five minutes. Crash reduction was imperative and so 
I have limited myself to three topics: The Columnists' Relation to De 
Gaulle in the summer of 1965, the "yellow peril" of October 1967, and the 
coming presidential election. 
The year 1968 marks the 200th anniversary of the syndicated columnist 
in American journalism. Thus the column antedates the Declaration of 
Independence by eight years. This first column, according to Frank 
Luther Mott, was called the "Journal of Occurrences," and it was exactly 
what its name implied, being compiled by a group of Boston patriots who 
complained of their sufferings at the hands of British soldiers and at the 
excessive financial burdens inflicted by the Townshend Acts. It appeared 
under other names in the colonial papers from Boston to Savannah, and it 
existed for about eleven months. Its purpose was undoubtedly "prop-
agandic,"1 its language was far from restrained, and it was constantly 
accused of falsehood. 2 There may not be such a wide difference between 
the columnists of the l 760's and those of the 1960's. 
The inspiration for the paper came not from the bicentennial year nor 
from some of the accepted "greats" among the columnists, but rather from 
Westbrook Pegler, Drew Pearson, Walter Winchell, and Holmes Alexander, 
some of whose writings served as illustrative material in recent classes. 
Pegler was venomous as always, Pearson was valuable this time, Winchell 
was veracious this time, and Alexander was variable. All four wrote of the 
1840's and, judged superficially, one might wonder if Henry Ford's defini-
tion was not the right one, but it will be found that at times Clio receives 
just, fair, and sometimes distinguished treatment from the columnists. 
" This paper was presented the evening before President Lyndon Johnson withdrew 
from the presidential race. 
1 Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism, A History: 1690-1960, New York, 
1962, p. 99. 
2 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence, New York, 1958, pp. 100-101 
121, 312-313. 
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Pegler set out to prove in two columns3 that Warren Delano, maternal 
grandfather of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had been "an old time opium 
smuggler." His partnership in the shipping firm of Russell and Company, 
and his vice consulship at Canton had been an early illustration of conflict 
of interest. Pegler was incited to this incendiary writing by reading the 
autobiography of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt "with its atmosphere of luxury 
pervading the story and the author's iron reticence concerning the Delano 
fortune." He replied to critics that it was true that other wealthy families 
had acquired fortunes by dubious means but the Roosevelts ( and of course 
the Delanos) were different, because ever since 1933 they had posed as 
"the patrons of that faceless, drooling monstrosity, so contemptuously iden-
tified as the American common man" and "as belligerent and fiercely 
righteous enemies of malefactors of great wealth." Pegler claimed that he 
did "a great deal of studious reading to get the facts," and he did produce 
an annotated bibliography of seven books and two old pamphlets. A 
columnist with a bibliography is something of a rara avis. 
Pearson, also writing on China, did not, like Pegler, produce a bibliog-
raphy but he did reproduce two important letters, one written by President 
Tyler to the Emperor of China dated July 12, 1843, and dubbed by Maury 
Maverick "the corniest note ever signed by a President," and the other 
Daniel Webster's instructions to Caleb Cushing, who was to make a com-
mercial treaty with China. 4 Here Pearson may have rendered a real service 
to amateur historians by reprinting these documents. The letter to the 
Emperor is not found in Richardson and is ignored by Tyler's two most 
recent biographers, Chitwood and Seagle. Pearson did not say how he 
came by the letter. That has a peculiarly modern ring. 
Walter Winchell wrote not of China but of a high society wedding in 
Washington on April 9, 1840.5 He opened his thirty-six line account with 
"It is not surprising that a Russian wrote Lolita" and then told of the wed-
ding of sixty-year-old Count Alexander Bodisco, Russian Minister to the 
United States, to sixteen-year-old Harriet Williams. Count Bodisco planned 
the wedding, insisting that the female attendants be contemporaries of the 
bride and that they be escorted by ministers and cabinet members. Jessie 
Benton, daughter of Thomas Hart Benton, was a bridesmaid, 6 and her diary 
has been a valuable source of social history for Washington. Count Bodisco 
was very popular, and his tenure of nearly twenty years was a good period in 
3 Greenville, S. C. News, September 7, 1944; October 25, 1944. 
4 Greenville, S. C. Piedmont, January 21, 1950. 
5 Mrs. Elizabeth Fries Ellet, The Court Circles of the Republic or Beauties and 
Celebrities of the Nation, Hartford, Conn. 1869, p. 277. 
6 Greenville News, August 22, 1962, "In New York with Walter Winchell." 
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Russo-American relations. Bodisco's parties were the talk of the town.7 
The power of the lavish and liquid hospitality of the Russian legation is 
attested by the late arrivals of Cabinet members at Jenny Lind's concert, 
when Daniel Webster insisted on singing "Hail Columbia" with the 
Swedish nightingale. 8 
Holmes Alexander, whose column covers a wide variety of subjects 
with equally varying degrees of accuracy, wrote of the Polk administration: 
"No time in our annals is more like Lyndon Johnson's administration than 
the administration of James K. Polk," beset as it was with "war hawks, 
pacifists and appeasers." No mention of the Whig Party. Under the heading 
"Are Americans Instruments of Providence Pursuing Their 'Manifest Des-
tiny'?"9, he answered himself with a strong, even violent, affirmative. 
1t was not the Polk reference, however, but Holme's column on De 
Gaulle that suggested him as the last of the four "pilots" for this study. In 
the summer of 1965 our relations with De Gaulle's Fifth French Republic 
were somewhat less than amicable. On June 3 Paul Douglas of Illinois had 
"delivered in the Senate . . . the strongest speech that has been made in 
criticism of the French government in several decades." The veteran 
columnist David Lawrence deemed it appropriate because De Gaulle 
"was not an imaginative person," and he should no longer "remain unin-
formed on how the American people felt about his unfriendliness to the 
United States."10 Ten days later under a heading "Showdown Looms with 
De Gaulle," the biographer and columnist, William S. White, presented a 
lengthy list of our grievances, not the least of which was the "ceaseless bath 
of animosity pouring out against us" from the De Gaulle controlled radio, 
television, and press. It surpassed anything ever said against us by any 
Iron Curtain country save Red China.11 
In July, Holmes Alexander, usually found with the hawks, cast historical 
truth to the four winds as he sought conciliation. Hopefully he declared 
"Once the U.S.A. and France-theirs is the oldest unbroken friendship of 
modern history-are back on cordial terms all else is possible."12 Five days 
later he was still hopeful and still inaccurate. Four Republican congressmen 
visiting France had "hoped to find out if they could the reason for the 
smash-up of a 190-year love affair between two fond nations." Admitting 
that there were genuine grievances on both sides and even accepting "the 
7 Thomas A. Bailey, American Faces Russia, Ithaca, N. Y., 1950, p. 65. 
8 Gladys Denny Shultz, Jenny Lind, The Swedish Nightingale, Philadelphia and 
New York, 1962, p. 242. 
9 Greenville News, February 9, 1967. 
10 Ibid., June 8, 1965. 
11 Ibid., June 18, 1965. 
12 Ibid., July 8, 1965. 
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unequivocal words 'My country, right or wrong,' it won't hurt us," argued 
Alexander, "to consider another country's viewpoint, especially when that 
country is such a one-time love-mate as France."13 The foregoing statements 
are commendable in purpose, but they can be questioned on at least two 
grounds. 
The friendship is not the oldest, if the Anglo-Portugese connection 
dating horn the early 18th century and perhaps earlier is considered.14 It 
is not unbroken, and neither is the 190-year-old Franco-American "love 
affair." One could easily point out a half a dozen lovers' quarrels between 
the "two fond nations." The two earliest are significant: the "Undeclared 
War" with France in the 1790's and the "French Claims Furor" (phrasing 
by Thomas A. Bailey) of the 1830's. If the first did not exist, Professor 
Alexander De Conde has switched from historical to creative writing.15 It 
seems unlikely that Mr. Alexander would be unfamiliar with the history of 
these decades, since he has written biographies of both Aaron Burr and 
Martin Van Buren.16 
The second incident, occurring in the reign of Louis Philippe, con-
cerned claims that the United States had against France dating back to 
1815. France acknowledged the validity of the claims, but there were delays 
in payment and President Andrew Jackson is reported to have said, "I 
know them French. They won't pay unless they are made to.''17 He devoted 
considerable space to this subject in both his annual messages of 1834 and 
1835. The French, perhaps thinking they were living in the days of John 
Adams and the Directory, "demanded satisfactory explanation of the Presi-
dent's message of 1834.'' Jackson's answer was "The honor of my country 
will never be stained by an apology from me for the statement of truth and 
the performance of my duty.''18 
President Lyndon Johnson quoted this sentence in his annual message 
of January 4, 1965, referring to the seemingly ungrateful recipients of our 
foreign aid abroad.19 This information comes from William S. White, who 
related that Johnson had been reading a biography of Jackson while he was 
13 Ibid., July 13, 1965. 
14 In 1914 Portugal spoke of her "ally of centuries" unaware of the Anglo-German 
diplomatic dickering about her colonies earlier in the year. 
15 Alexander DeConde, The Quasi War. The Politics and Diplomacy of the 
Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801, New York, 1966. 
16 Who's Who, 1966-67, p. 35. The books are The Proud Pretender, Life of Aaron 
Burr ( 1937 ) and American Talleyrand, Life of Mart in Van Buren ( 1935). 
17 Quoted by Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American Peopl,e, New 
York, 1964, p. 195. 
18 J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Washington, 1896, pp. 
100-107; 157-160. 
19 Greenville News, January 8, 1965. 
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composing his message and that the President associates himself with 
Jackson in a number of ways. Since Harry Truman had earlier done the 
same thing, only the most pious or the most optimistic would bother to 
murmur a Requiescat in Pace for "Old Hickory." Possibly White would 
consider it an honor to Jackson to be quoted by Johnson, whose biography, 
The Professional, Lyndon B. Johnson, he published in 1964. It was pro-
nounced "surely the most embarrassingly appreciative political biography 
ever written."20 Both White's adoration of Lyndon Johnson and his con-
tempt for enemies of the President or of Secretary Rusk are apparent in all 
his writing. In August, 1967, these critics were likened to the "Gerald 
Nyes of the 30's [who] cried out against any rational rearmament with 
melodramatic sobs about munition makers [as] 'Merchants of Death'."21 The 
President and Dean Rusk were "a pair of country boys who have gone a long 
way the hard way ... never faintly understood by the eternally collegiate 
types .... "22 
In early 1967 White was again suspicious of General De Gaulle because 
of Robert Kennedy's visit in Paris. White feared "the cordial consultation 
with the world's most bitterly anti-American statesman outside the Com-
munist bloc itself." There was a "baseless tale spread around the world 
that Kennedy was returning here with some kind of third hand Communist 
peace feeler" somehow obtained in Paris. White's uneasiness was all the 
greater because Kennedy had "long since ... become a part-time dove 
whereas his brother was a resolute hawk albeit a prudent and sensible 
one.''23 
Two months later Vice President Humphrey was visiting De Gaulle and 
Drew Pearson's account of this visit was quite different from White's 
report of Senator Kennedy's. According to the "Washington Merry Go 
Round," Humphrey's aides had prepared for him a banquet toast to De 
Gaulle. It called attention to the two occasions on which we had come to 
the aid of France but Humphrey deemed this "an insult" and declared, 
" 'I want to talk about what France has done for America, not what America 
has done for France.' " So he spoke of Yorktown, of the debt we owe France 
for our independence ... of her loan to us in 1777: "all of these are 
cherished but 'What binds us ... is our common belief in Liberty. The 
French slogan, "Liberty, equality, fraternity," stands together in history 
with the American slogan, "Liberty and the pursuit of happiness" '." He 
called attention to "the names of the French scholars, writers and scientists 
20 William S. Rivers, The Opinion Makers, Boston, 1965, p. 168. White has also 
written biographies of Robert Taft and of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
21 Greenville News, August 29, 1967. 
22 Ibid., October 7, 1966. 
23 Ibid., February 16, 1967. 
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who have inspired America, and paid tribute to 'Le Grande' leader who 
symbolizes 'La Grande' nation." In conclusion Humphrey declared that 
"No disagreement between our countries today can possibly erase these 
immortal memories." According to Pearson "Tears welled in De Gaulle's 
eyes as the Vice President spoke. Later the venerable old French leader 
told the United States ambassador, 'Chip' Bohlen: 'Your Vice President is 
a scholar'," One wonders why Pearson had to spoil the story by stating that 
Humphrey's talks with German and Italian Cabinets were much more 
important. 24 
Charles "Chip" Bohlen, one of the country's outstanding ambassadors, 
appeared also in C. L. Sulzbergers column in the St. Louis Post Dispatch 
for January 29, 1968, under the heading "U. S. Needs a Good Man in 
Paris." Sulzberger, of the royal family of The New York Times, warned 
that Bohlen would be hard to replace, for "When the pot boiled the hottest, 
Mr. Bohlen helped keep the lid from popping off." Sulzberger should be 
able to speak with authority. He served as Paris-based Times correspondent 
for more than a decade and in 1962 produced the book The Test: De Gaulle 
in Algeria. A new chapter in his career is in a book on the Greek crisis, 
promised-or threatened-by the Grove Press. 25 
Regarding the second topic of this paper, the month of October, 1967, 
may well go down in the annals of journalism as the "Month of the Tempest 
in the Yellow Tea Pot" because of a broadcast of Secretary Rusk's press 
conference on Thursday, October 12, and the resulting "yellow peril" 
columns. The broadcast was part of the Administration's crackdown on its 
critics, mainly congressional, of its Vietnam policy. Now, Dean Rusk 
never used the term "yellow peril" at the conference. When asked by 
John Finney of The New York Times why he regarded "United States 
security as being 'at stake' in Vietnam" Rusk made the reply often quoted 
with diverse interpretations. It was "Within the next decade or two 
there will be a billion Chinese on the mainland armed with nuclear 
weapons, with no certainty what the rest of Asia will do." On the following 
Sunday, James Reston wrote in his column that Rusk had made a "carefully 
prepared and impassioned defense of the Administration's Vietnam policy" 
24 Greenville Piedrrwnt, April 22, 1967. 
25 See The New York Times, December 17, 1967, Book Review Section, p. 11 for 
a full page advertisement of The Death of Derrwcracy, Greece and the American 
Conscience by Stephen Rousseas. A special cha_pter written by "sociologist Gertrude 
Lenzer analyzes the reporting of The New York Times and the political role of its 
columnist and correspondent, C. L. Sulzberger in Greece." 
26 "Washington: Dean Rusk and 'The Yellow Peril,'" The New York Times, October 
15, 1967. In reporting this conference the next day Finney does not mention the 
billion Chinese and nuclear weapons. He stresses "Asian Communism." See St. Louis 
Post Dispatch, October 13, 1967, Section C, pp. 1 and 4. 
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and in so doing "revived the old emotional dread of 'The Yellow Peril.' " 
Then Reston stated that the Yellow Peril had originated with Emperor 
William II in the 1890's. Reston gave no citations-columnists rarely d(}-
but could have performed a valuable service in giving this much infor-
mation, for it is amazing how many people believe that the Yellow Peril 
sprang full grown from the malevolent brain of William Randolph Hearst. 
Reston could have cited both William L. Langer and Parker Thomas Moon 
who provide sources and place the exact date in 1895. Kaiser Bill was using 
the yellow peril as a diplomatic lever on the Russian Czar, and among other 
things, in 1895 he commissioned a German artist to paint an "allegorical 
picture" of the Archangel Michael sent from Heaven to urge the Europeans 
to unite in resisting the inroads of "Buddhism, heathenism, and barbarism 
for the Defence of the Cross.''27 
The second Sunday after Rusk's news conference Reston summarized 
the week thus: 
This has not been a very happy period. The Secretary of State has 
been trying to scare people with apocalyptic visions of a billion Chinese 
armed with nuclear weapons,and, equally silly, his critics, including this 
correspondent, have been escalating the word war with talk about the 
"yellow peril."28 
By this time Dean Rusk had taken "the unusual step of 'clarifying' 
his recent warnings on Communist China by saying that it had nothing to 
do with the Chinese race.'' And Robert J. McCloskey, Press Officer for the 
State Department, in reply to articles in certain Sunday papers of October 
15, "strongly denied that Rusk had invoked the so-called 'yellow peril' to 
justify the defense as being in the national interest.''29 
Joseph Kraft, columnist for the Washington Star and other papers since 
1963, entered the fray on the 18th and asserted that "Raw politics" might 
"explain the recent evocation of the 'Yellow Peril' by Secretary Rusk and 
Vice President Humphrey.'' Anyway, it represented "a truly dangerous 
escalation which puts this country in a position that has elements of 
madness. Sane American policy," he wrote, "meant avoiding major war on 
the Asian mainland" and attempted proof by citing: 
27 William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, New York, 1951, 
pp. 387-448; Parker Thomas Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, New York, 1926, 
pp. 332-346. Langer notes that the Japanese Count Okuma also used the phrase in 
1895, and Brooks Adams in The Law af Civilization and Decay, 1895, cites the danger 
but does not use the term. 
28 "Washington: 'Elevate Them Guns a Little Lower,'" The New York Times, 
October 22, 1967. See Joseph Kraft's explanation for the use of the term in his 
column, St. Louis Post Dispatch, October 20, 1967. 
29 Greenville News, October 18, 1967. 
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For the same reason we fought World War II on the periphery of 
Asia. And for the same reason time after time-in the 1931 Man-
churian crisis, in the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917 and the Root-
Takahira agreement of 1908-we accepted blatant violations of the 
open door principle.30 
It might be difficult to substantiate this argument in toto but two days 
later Kraft insisted on it and declared that "every important Secretary of 
State in this century . . . has drawn back from conflict on the Asian main-
land."33 He named six but omitted ten whose terms total thirty years. 
A third column of Kraft's appeared at the end of the month. It was 
concerned with motives rather than events. Political motives, not too cred-
itable, were imputed to "Administration Strategists [who] think they can 
turn the tables. They think that they can sell the President as a beleagured 
national leader beset by treacherous enemies at home and abroad." This 
was why they resorted to "the deliberate misinterpretation of the term 
'yellow peril'-to pick a public fight with Vietnam critics." The column 
closed with the description of a president who really did become a "be-
leagured leader" taken from "one of Arthur Schlesinger's histories." It is 
not of "any of the presidents Mr. Johnson is pleased to think of as his 
models. It is not Truman, nor Franklin Roosevelt, nor Lincoln in the long 
watches of the night . . . . The description . . . covers the last two years 
of Herbert Hoover."32 
It was inevitable that "Pundit Walter Lippman"33 should enter the 
lists. Our policy was wrong and the "original mistake was to commit this 
country to a larger land war on the Asian mainland . . . . It has always 
been axiomatic that we must exert our power off shore and must never 
allow ourselves to get pulled deeply onto the mainland . . . three presi-
dents have remembered and restated that axiom-Presidents Eisenhower, 
Kennedy and Johnson himself in 1964."34 Two days later on October 25, 
Lippman was still discussing our "mistaken strategy" and strongly advised 
that we correct it by making it "our declared policy to pull our forces back 
to territory which is separated from the mainland by water" thus taking 
"Australia and New Zealand as the proper forward bases of American power 
in the South Pacific."35 
On October 29 Howard K. Smith, personable television commentator 
and columnist for the last two years, angrily took up the fight with a 
30 "The Most Dangerous Escalation," St. Louis Post Dispatch, October 18, 1967. 
31 Ibid., October 20, 1967, "Rusk Confuses Our Interest in Asia." 
32 Ibid., October 31, 1967, "Grassroots as Troubled as Washington." 
33 Time, October 27, 1967. 
34 "The Fundamental Mistake in Vietnam," St. Louis Post Dispatch, October 23, 
1967. 
35 Ibid., October 25, 1967, "Mistaken Strategy in a Mistaken War." 
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column headed "Lippman's Thesis Unreasonable. VIET DISSENTERS 
SHOULD DE-ESCALATE."36 Intending to demolish the arguments of 
both Reston and Lippman, Smith spurned the truce Reston had offered 
when he had quoted Andrew Jackson's words at the Battle of New Orleans, 
"'Let's elevate them guns a little lower'" by declaring that "equating the 
two [sides] is a false exercise. The dissenters alone" were to blame. "It 
is the baby doctor from Ohio and the preacher from Yale who have en-
couraged young people to stop thinking and break the law-not their 
opponents." He pointed out that Reston, dismissing Rusk's arguments 
about the billion Chinese as "silly," had "dredged up the Kaiser's old racist 
and demagogic cry of the 'Yellow Peril'" to discredit the Secretary, perhaps 
the "least race-minded of U. S. officials." Lippman's notion that we 
should use our power off shore and never become involved in a mainland 
war ( Lippman was referring only to Asia) met with ridicule when Smith 
inquired "Where does this piece of history come from?" He added 
sarcastically: 
U. S. forces brought the decision in World War I but there is no 
record that they remained in boats afloat in the North Sea. Did the 
D-Day invasion really never happen? Were the Greeks and the South 
Koreans stimulated to keep their independence by armies of Americans 
cheering from off shore?37 
At the end of 1967 Holmes Alexander felt strongly that "Secretary 
Rusk never spoke truer words than his warning about the Yellow Peril, 'a 
billion Chinese armed with the nuclear bomb.' The swarming of savage 
tribes is not historical rhetoric but historic realism" and he warned "The 
president chosen next year had better not fear to discuss it, nor the people 
to hear it discussed in relation to the Vietnam War.''38 
This shrill warning will serve as a transition to the final topic of this 
paper-the columnists and the coming presidential election. By a sort of 
panoramic review of earlier elections these versatile writers attempted to 
forecast accurately what might happen in the next seven months. At least 
a dozen columnists surveyed almost as many elections and reached varied 
conclusions. The elections ranged from 1824 to 1964 with 1948 definitely 
the winner. 
In early September, Tom Wicker, New York Times Washington Bureau, 
wrote, "Election year 1968 is beginning to look like 1948 in more ways than 
one." First Johnson will undoubtedly have three opponents, the Republican 
nominee, George Wallace of the right, and "perhaps Martin Luther King of 
the left.'' ( This column antedated Senator McCarthy's announcement.) 
116 Charlotte, N. C. Observer, October 29, 1967. 
37 Ibid. 
38 "The Grimmest Election Of A Lifetime," Greenville News, December 28, 1967. 
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Truman had Dewey of the Republicans, Wallace of the Progressives, and 
Strom Thurmond of the States Rights Party. Secondly, Wicker writes, 
"Mr. Johnson also is beginning to hoist faint signals suggesting that, as Mr. 
Truman did in similarly unpromising circumstances, he may run a strongly 
partisan campaign against Republican iniquities particularly those of the 
Republican delegation in Congress." Thirdly, there is a resemblance be-
tween :Mr. Truman's "do-nothing Eightieth Congress" and Johnson's "con-
servative Ninetieth Congress," but Wicker does not think this parallel can 
be pushed too far.3 9 
President Johnson himself confirmed the parallel when, as Paul Scott 
reported, he spoke at "an unannounced meeting with Democratic congres-
sional leaders" in late November and said, "The American people are going 
to see a fighting president from now till next November. It could be 1948 
all over again. The political pundits are all wet when they say I can't wage 
a campaign similar to the one Harry Truman conducted against the 80th 
Congress in 1948." Johnson said there would be one big difference. Instead 
of "the Republican controlled 80th Congress" he would attack "'the unholy 
alliance' in the 90th Congress-the Republicans and the Southern Demo-
crats who vote day after day to wreck my program."40 
Joseph Kraft had written somewhat sarcastically in October of "a 
beleaguered president" and then reported how Under Secretary of State, 
Eugene Rostow, in a speech at the University of Kansas, had likened 
Johnson to Truman "who had to face the full brunt of Stalinist pressure 
abroad" while at home he had to "fight off Henry Wallace on one side 
and Senator Joseph McCarthy on the other."41 James J. Kilpatrick, described 
as "the fiercely individualistic editor of the Richmond News Leader,"42 also 
writes a column and warned Johnson's "foes of the right" to speak "gently, 
gently. When the moment comes that everyone seems to be calling the 
President a you-know-what, a sentimental people will rise up howling, he's 
OUR YOU-KNOW-WHAT and it will be Truman over Dewey all over 
again."43 
After the January appointment of Clark Clifford as Secretary of De-
fense the likeness was even more strongly emphasized. Drew Pearson and 
Jack Anderson, delving into some of their old columns, traced the Truman-
39 "A Campaign in the Truman Pattern?", St. Louis Post Dispatch, September 5, 
1967. 
40 Paul Scott, "'Alliance' Is Target Of Johnson Attack," Greenville News, November 
27, 1967. 
41 Joseph Kraft, "Republicans Planning Another 'Korea,'" St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
October 24, 1967. 
4 2 Time, January 21, 1966, p . 30. 
43 James J. Kilpatrick, "An Underdog President," Greenville News, October 7, 1967. 
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Clifford association from 1946 to 1950 showing how great had been Clifford's 
influence.44 Reston relates how, late in November 1947, Clifford handed 
President Truman a forty page memorandum on how to win the presidential 
election of 1948. Drastic measures were called for and he outlined "a 
strategy for changing Truman's image. He must become 'a man of the peo-
ple' trying to do his best" and he must make "insepction tours" throughout 
the country even before the party convention. This program with some 
attention paid to the farm problem plus "the clumsy cooperation of Tom 
Dewey" made Truman a winner in 1948. And Republicans might do well 
to avoid nominating Rockefeller and Regan since Truman had beaten the 
governors of New York and California, Tom Dewey and Earl Warren in 
1948.45 
There were additional shorter references to the similarities of 1948 
to 1968 but one of the leading figures in the earlier drama sharply dissented 
from these comparisons. Senator Strom Thurmond discussed the topic 
with Frank Van Der Linden of the Washington Bureau of the Greenville 
News. Thurmond asserted that when he was a candidate in 1948 the "stand 
of the two national parties was so close that I felt the people had no 
choice." 1968 would be different since the Republican Party ( he joined 
it in 1964) would be "taking a much sounder stance against big government 
spending and centralization of power in Washington, as well as more 
strongly opposing Communism and giving attention to reducing the lawless-
ness rampant throughout the country. Finally, 1968 is different from 1948 
in that this country faces a great international crisis and this problem 
alone . . . demands we do nothing which might assist the present adminis-
tration to remain in power."46 
Granted that 1948 is the "magic year" for the Democrats, Joseph 
Kraft claimed that 1952 was the good year for Republicans who "are 
getting ready to stick the Democrats with Vietnam much as they stuck 
them with Korea. Just as in 1952, Republicans are coming on not as 
hawks or doves, but as men now out who can come in and make a fresh 
start."47 David Lawrence wrote that Eisenhower's promise to "go to Korea" 
was emphasized by Republican campaign managers and this "maneuver 
helped the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket." He cited Wilson in 1916 and Roose-
velt in 1940 and points out that "in both instances war came quickly after 
44 Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, "Clark Clifford Was Big Truman Helper," 
Greenville Piedmont, January 25, 1968. 
45 James Reston, "Washington: Clifford and the Strategy of 1948 and 1968," 
The New York Times, January 21, 1968. Reston had made the point about the New 
York and California governors in his column "Rockefeller's Rise in the Polls" in St. 
Louis Post Dispatch, September 21, 1967. 
46 Greenville News, February 9, 1968. 
47 See note 41 above. 
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the election."48 Lippman pointed out that even winning a war does not 
guarantee success at the polls and cites Wilson in 1918 ( mid-term elections) 
and Churchhill in 1945. 49 The election of 1952 inevitably recalls Adlai 
Stevenson and, on the subject of Rockefeller's reluctance, Reston wrote on 
October 27 that Rockefeller "does not sound like the reluctant Adlai 
Stevenson of 1952."50 
The elections of 1956 and 1960 seem to have attracted little attention 
although they were briefly noted last November to show how Eugene 
McCarthy had been "done out" of the vice presidency in both years as 
well as in 1964. 51 However, 1964 owes its chief importance to solemn 
warnings given to both parties. In a column entitled "Night of the Long 
Knives Begins for Nixon" James J. Kilpatrick lamented the attacks being 
made on the 1960 Republican candidate and he was worried about the 
enthusiasm for Rockefeller. He asked if the Republicans would "absolve 
the Hon. Rocky of his sins of 1964 and swallow his political views willy 
nilly." Can they forget that "he took a powder on Goldwater?" The old 
saying about elephants may not be true "but a whole lot of elephants who 
met in San Francisco still cherish some vivid memories."52 Tom Wicker 
thinks that the Republican nomination of 1964 has a warning for both 
parties. The professionals and old-line party members lost control of the 
Republican nominating process, and the "Democratic party in 1968 could 
conceivably fall into the hands of impassioned, swarming amateurs who 
would do something the professionals never would do."53 Joseph Kraft, 
perhaps with wishful thinking, sees a much greater threat to Johnson from 
1964 in the "sudden increase in dislike of the Vietnam war-the arrangement 
made tacitly back in 1964 that the war wouldn't hurt much, that it was 
just another foreign policy committment, like those undertaken by Presi-
dents Kennedy and Eisenhower."54 
In 1864, a century earlier, there was a war election and Lincoln did 
rate the term "beleaguered." Of late Johnson has manifested a tendency to 
48 David Lawrence, "The Old Game of Politics," Greenville News, December 30, 
1967. 
49 Walter Lippman, "LBJ Could Win War and Lose Election," St. Louis Post 
Dispatch, December 19, 1967. 
50 Ibid., October 27, 1967, James Reston, "Rockefeller Can Afford to Wait." 
51 Ibid., November 13, 1967, Joseph Kraft, "Senator McCarthy's Serious Challenge"; 
Holmes Alexander, "Professors Are Making People Think," Greenville News, November 
23, 1967; ibid., November 15, 1967, William S. White, "McCarthr May Fuse Split in 
Party Ranks." White finds parallels between Henry Wallace o 1948 and Eugene 
McCarthy of 1968 since both were "dumped" by their party. See also Joseph Kraft, 
"The McCarthy Enigma", Washington Post, November 12, 1967. 
52 Greenville News, January 19, 1968. 
53 Tom Wicker, "'Impassioned, Swarming Amateurs,'" St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
November 2, 1967. 
54 Ibid., October 27, 1967, Joseph Kraft, "The Unhappy Man in The Middle." 
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identify himself with Lincoln as if Honest Abe had displaced Old Hickory. 
Since he can "find little consolation in the news, he is seeking it in 
history" wrote Reston. In a recent speech at the Lincoln Memorial, honor-
ing the birthday of the Emancipator, Johnson avowed that Lincoln would 
well have understood the difficult times in which we live. Reston finds this 
a dubious analogy for "Lincoln was fighting an American Civil War in 
which he was terrified of foreign intervention whereas Mr. Johnson is 
intervening in a conflict that has at lease some elements of a civil war."55 
Marquis W. Childs, who can legally appear in this study since he is 
a sort of "Columnist Emeritus," wrote of Nixon that he has taken the 
hardest of all lines, attacking the Administration for not prosecuting the 
war more vigorously. Childs held that "the war as a campaign issue is 
tricky beyond belief." He offered numerous facts on the political align-
ments of 1864. Lincoln, "one of the shrewdest politicians ever to occupy 
the White House," subsequently explained his victory to his Secretary of 
Treasure, Hugh McCulloch: "'I am here by the blunders of the Democrats. 
If, instead of resolving that the war was a failure, they had resolved that I 
was a failure and denounced me for not more vigorously prosecuting it, 
I should not have been reelected . . .' .''56 
Drew Pearson told of a "Lincoln withdrawal" movement organized by 
prominent Republicans, of the harsh criticism of a press that was "dovish 
and critical" of the draft and of other calamities. He ended on a note of 
fantasy. " 'Times, mused the tall man in the long four-posted bed ( once 
occupied by Lincoln) have not really changed at all.' "57 Finally, Holmes 
Alexander brought out the old quotation but admitted its inadequacy. 
This President is "not in a mere stream . . . he is stirrup high in a 
torrent.''58 
Less frequently cited than 1864 is the election of 1860. Kraft suggested 
that the "Democratic coalition which has basically dominated the country 
since 1936 is now falling apart" and the result may well be a "landmark 
election-an election like those of 1860, or 1896, or 1932 where power 
passed decisively from one party to another.''59 This election was also 
mentioned by Tom Littlewood of the Chicago Sun Times, pinch-hitting for 
Roscoe Drummond in the Youngstown, Ohio, Vindicator, among other 
55 James Reston, "MR. LINCOLN AND MR. JOHNSON, LBJ Seeks Consolation 
in History," The State ( Columbia, S. C.), February 16, 1968. 
56 St. Louis Post Dispatch, November 28, 1967, p. 1 B. 
57 Drew Pearson, "DC Feelings Same as Lincoln's Woes," Greenville Piedmont, 
October 27, 1967. 
58 Holmes Alexander, "Winds Of Rumor About LBJ's Running," Greenville News, 
February 1, 1968. 
59 Joseph Kraft, "McNamara Dropped With Eye on Votes?", St. Louis Post 
Dispatch, December l, 1967. 
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papers. This column was headed "Do Convention Sites Matter?" and 
pointed out that "Chicago has been the scene of several of the most 
meaningful conventions. Lincoln was nominated there in 1860, Bryan in 
1896 and Roosevelt in 1932." He adds, "Washington pundits sometimes for-
get the extent to which the Midwestern attitudes have influenced the 
course of American history." To bolster his argument he uses the one 
reference located to the election of 1876. "In 1876-after 1860-the most 
fateful election for the American Negro-the parties held their conventions 
in the two beer-drinking riverfront cities: St. Louis and Cincinnati ... . 
The schizophrenic national attitude about race resembled today's. Shortly 
thereafter, the national government handed 'the Negro problem' back to 
the South with consequences that continued for the better part of a cen-
tury."60 
The election of 1932 figures prominently in the story. How much more 
mileage can the Democrats get out of New Deal politics? Such a program, 
according to Reston, has worked for them in seven out of the last nine 
presidential elections.61 Kraft doubted whether the "issue of economic 
security [which] shaped the last great land-mark election of 1932 is relevant 
today. For many, economic security has been achieved but not "the ease 
supposed to go along with .. . security." The obstacles in the way of 
ease include "crime, congested traffic, overcrowded schools; high interest 
rates; kids smoking pot, and for hard political purposes, the place of the 
Negro in America-the issue of race."62 Lippman, tracing various coalitions 
that have formed our two great parties, concludes that 1968 may be a 
critical year-one like 1932, when a new coalition of groups and factions 
emerged and took over political power. Then he speculates that this may 
be the year when the Democratic coalition breaks up to "give place to a 
new coalition formed by the Republicans."63 
Still another possibility-some would use a stronger term-is opened by 
George Wallace, who, according to Joseph Alsop, "promises to be the most 
significant third-party contender since Theodore Roosevelt."64 Wallace 
might drop a "political bombshell and cause the election to be thrown into 
the House of Representatives" in which case, says James J. Kilpatrick, we 
are "back tc 1824." In such an event there are wild speculations and any 
60 Youngstown, Ohio Vindicator, January 1, 1968. 
61 James Reston, "Back to the Ranch and the Budget," St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
December 28, 1967. 
62 Joseph Kraft, "Independents Hold Balance of Power," Greenville News, Decem-
ber 8, 1967. 
63 Walter Lippman, "End of a Governing Coalition?", St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
December 18, 1967. 
64 Ibid., January 11, 1968, Joseph Alsop, "Wallace in the Race." 
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"corrupt bargain" of 1824, real or imagined, would sink into pale insignifi-
cance. 65 
And still the parallels come! From New York's uncollected garbage 
emerges Calvin Coolidge and the election of 1920. Doris Fleeson is re-
minded of the time Coolidge broke the Boston police strike of 1919, "his 
only memorable act and it landed him in the White House." Could this 
happen for Mayor Lindsay? Has his "golden boy" image been erased or 
has Rockefeller suffered even more?06 
Reports emanating from Hanoi say "there'll be no peace talks until 
after November, 1968, when there'll be a new man in the White House, a 
Republican President. Then only will they talk of peace."07 The French 
Directory used similar words regarding the possible election of Jeffersonian 
Republicans over Federalists in 1796. 
Have all the columnists overlooked this election? 
65 James J. Kilpatrick, "Wallace May Drop Blockbuster in 1968," Greenville 
News, September 2, 1967. 
66 Doris Fleeson, "Rockefeller Hurt by Strike Decision," St. Louis Post Dispatch, 
February 16, 1968; see also Drew Pearson, "Rocky's 'Shine' Off Amid N. Y. Garbage," 
Greenville Piedrrwnt, February 19, 1968. 
67 See note 57 above. 
CONSTITUTION 
I 
The name of this organization shall be The South Carolina Historical 
Association. 
II 
The objects of the Association shall be to promote historical studies in 
the State of South Carolina; to bring about a closer relationship among per-
sons living in this State who are interested in history; and to encourage the 
preservation of historical records. 
III 
Any person approved by the executive committee may become a mem-
ber by paying $4.00 and after the first year may continue a member by 
paying an annual fee of $4.00. 
After having been a member of the Association for twenty years, and 
upon reaching the age of sixty-five, any member upon notifying the Secre-
tary-Treasurer in writing, may be elected an emeritus member by the Execu-
tive Committee. Emeritus members have all the rights and privileges of 
membership without being required to pay the annual dues. 
Members in student status shall pay annual dues of only $2.00. 
IV 
The officers shall be a president, a vice-president, and a secretary and 
treasurer who shall be elected by ballot at each regular annual meeting. A 
list of nominations shall be presented by the executive committee, but nomi-
nations from the floor may be made. The officers shall have the duties and 
perform the functions customarily attached to their respective offices with 
such others as may from time to time be prescribed. 
V 
There shall be an executive committee made up of the officers and of 
three other members elected by ballot for a term of three years; at the first 
election, however, one shall be elected for two years. Vacancies shall be 
filled by election in the same manner at the annual meeting following their 
occurrence. Until such time they shall be filled by appointment by the 
president. The duties of the executive committee shall be to fix the date 
and place of the annual meeting, to attend to the publication of the pro-
ceedings of the Association, to prepare a program for the annual meeting, 
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to prepare a list of nominations for the officers of the Association as provided 
in Article IV, and such other duties as may be from time to time assigned 
to them by the Association. There shall be such other committees as the 
president may appoint, or be instructed to appoint, by resolution of the 
Association. 
VI 
There shall be an annual meeting of the Association at the time and 
place appointed by the executive committee. 
VII 
A. The Association shall publish annually its proceedings to be known 
as The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association. It shall 
contain the minutes of the annual meeting together with such papers and 
documents selected by the executive committee as may be published without 
incurring a deficit. Each fifth year, beginning in 1956, the Proceedings shall 
include a copy of the constitution and by-laws of the Association. 
B. All papers read at the annual meeting shall become the porperty of 
the Association except as otherwise may be provided by the executive 
committee. 
C. The executive committee shall annually elect an editor of the Pro-
ceedings. He shall have authority to appoint an associate editor and shall 
be a member of the executive committee, but without vote. 
VIII 
This constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the members 
present at the annual business meeting. 
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